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Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional?
An Appointments Clause Challenge
TUAN SAMAHON*
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy judges are powerful judicial officers. They exercise
jurisdiction over some of the largest commercial matters heard in the
federal courts, including public company bankruptcies that reach into the
multibillions in total assets prepetition.' They decide not only
commercial disputes, but also significant constitutional questions
Notwithstanding a state's sovereign immunity, they entertain claims
brought against state entities.' They exercise broad equitable powers;4
reach parties nationwide;5 may hold parties and counsel in contempt;
6
conduct jury trials with the parties' consent,7 and-without any consent-
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I thank Janet Alexander, Rachel Anderson, Randy Barnett, Jordan Barry, Brett Birdsong, Leif
Clark, Tim Cory, John Harrison, Steven Johnson, Bob Lawless, Gary Lawson, Lynn LoPucki, Bruce
Markell, James Pfander, Nancy Rapoport, Judith Resnik, Jeff Stempel, Jean Sternlight, David Stras,
and the participants of the UNLV "quarter-baked" Faculty Workshop held on May 10, 2007, and the
Junior Federal Courts Faculty Workshop at American University Washington College of Law held on
April 4, 2oo8, for their comments as I drafted and revised this Article. I thank also Robert Cummings,
Kelly Dove, Airene Haze, Michael Murphy, and Chris Stein for their excellent research assistance.
i. For example, consider these multibillion dollar bankruptcies in prepetition assets filed during
the last ten years (in billions of U.S. dollars): Lehman Brothers Holdings ($684. 1), Washington Mutual
($324.6), Worldcom ($124.9), Enron ($80.3), Conseco ($73.5), Refco Finance ($53), IndyMac Bancorp
($32.2), Calpine ($29.9), New Century Financial ($27.4), Pacific Gas and Electric ($26.9), and Global
Crossing ($5.0. See Bankruptcy Research Database, Company Profile. http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
corporations.asp (last visited Dec. 15, 2008) (follow company profiles to obtain prefiling assets in
millions of current dollars).
2. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989) (reversing a bankruptcy
judge who had denied Seventh Amendment jury trial rights to defendants who had not submitted
claims against a bankruptcy estate).
3. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006).
4. II U.S.C. § 1o5(a) (2oo6); see also Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1105, 1111-
12 (2007) (noting broad equitable authority granted to bankruptcy judges by § 105(a) as well as noting
a court's inherent power).
5. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
6. See infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (2006).
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resolve "core proceedings." 8 They serve renewable fourteen-year terms.9
Short of impeachment, they are subject to removal during their term of
office only for limited grounds for cause.'" They are also invaluable to the
federal judiciary for their case capacity and service." Bankruptcy judges
are not mere judicial pawns, but the knights of the federal judicial
hierarchy.
Yet as powerful and as useful as these bankruptcy judges may be,
their method of selection arguably violates the Appointments Clause. No
President appointed any of the 339 presently serving judges.'" Instead,
the courts of appeals appointed them pursuant to statutory authority.'
3
Although it is the President's prerogative to nominate and, upon the
Senate's confirmation, appoint the principal officers of the United States,
Congress may by law vest the appointment of "inferior officers" in the
courts under the excepting provision of the Appointments Clause,
occasionally referred to as the "Excepting Clause."'4 In exercising this
option, Congress impliedly characterized bankruptcy judges as "inferior
officers." This Article argues that this congressional assumption may not
be well placed, at least under the balancing approach of Morrison v.
Olson.5 Bankruptcy judges have accrued tenure, safeguards against
removal,'6 expansive jurisdiction,'7 and duties that are incompatible (at
least under Morrison) with inferior officer status.'8 If they are principal
officers, they are not amenable to judicial appointment. The President
must appoint them pursuant to the usual Article II procedure. Thus,
their appointments are constitutionally suspect, and their judgments and
orders are of doubtful validity.
Whether bankruptcy judges are inferior officers remains an open
question. The Supreme Court has never addressed itself to the precise
question of bankruptcy judges, and its applicable precedents-Morrison
v. Olson 9  and Edmond v. United States2 -suggest different and
conflicting answers. No academic commentator has addressed the
8. See infra notes 354-57 and accompanying text.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 152(b).
to. Id. § 152(e).
I. During the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2007, bankruptcy judges terminated
almost 865,000 cases. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 295 tbl. F (2008). During that same period,
approximately 1.3 million cases remained pending and over 8oo,ooo cases were commenced. Id.
12. See id. at 45 tbl.IZ.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a).
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15. 487 U.S. 654, 671-73 (1988).
r6. See supra note IO and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
I8. See infra Part.IV.B.
19. 487 U.S. 654.
20. 520 U.S. 651,662-63 (1997).
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question of whether modem bankruptcy judges constitute inferior
officers.' Criticism of the bankruptcy system has focused almost
universally on whether the judges, who wield the judicial power of the
United States, ought to be shielded by Article III tenure and salary
protection.2 This oversight is understandable. Commentators remained
fixated on winning the last war-the striking down of the 1978 Act in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.23 -and
therefore focused on the Article III issue. They spent little attention on
the Article II issue of appointment by the circuit courts. Although this
Article is about a problem of similar scale to Marathon, it is about the
bankruptcy court's other separation-of-powers problem.
The Article develops its argument in five parts. Part I sets up the
present problem by explaining how a colorable Appointments Clause
challenge became possible. Since the earliest adjudicators-
commissioners, registers, and referees-the method of appointment by
the Courts of Law has remained largely unchanged. The adjudicators,
however, steadily accumulated accoutrements of principal officer status
such that the modern office no longer resembles its modest inferior
officer forbearers. Although the appointment method remained
constant, the office may have outgrown it.
Part II introduces the interpretive fork in the road of the operation
of the Excepting Clause. It examines the original public meaning of
"inferior officer" and develops the Supreme Court's two competing
interpretations. Morrison defined an inferior office as a "lesser" one and
balanced in the abstract the characteristics and powers of office to make
its determination. 4 Edmond, which did not purport to overrule Morrison
(and has not been treated as having done so by lower courts or
commentators), interpreted "inferior officer" as a "subordinate" officer. 5
Neither case, however, addressed directly the status of bankruptcy
judges.
In Part III, the Article explains why a challenge is possible by
exploring three narratives about the relationship between Morrison and
21. A legal scholar did recently call (in passing) bankruptcy judges "inferior officers." John
Harrison, Addition by Subtraction, 92 VA. L. REV. 1853, 1855 n.9 (2006). Several academic
commentators testified before Congress in 1975 concerning a proposal to vest the appointments of
bankruptcy judges in the Courts of Law. The majority view was that such an arrangement would
violate the Appointments Clause. See infra notes 29i-q- and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 121-22 (1989); Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and
Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675 (1985); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker, Commentary, Article IIl and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts
are Unconstitutional, 70 GEo. L.J. 297 (I98I).
23. 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
24. 487 U.S. 654, 671-73 (1988).
25. 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (997).
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Edmond and their competing interpretations. Drawing upon archival and
other sources, the Article argues that attempts at re-conciling the two
cases are implausible, as too are claims that they govern in different
domains. Part III concludes that the best account of their relationship is
that Edmond's approach to the Appointments Clause has overruled
Morrison. Nonetheless, given the uncertainty about the relationship
between the two cases, it is plausible for litigants to claim that
bankruptcy judges are principal officers.
Part IV details what an Article II challenge might look like and
responds to potential objections. It suggests that two such challenges are
possible-both under Morrison's interpretation of "inferior" as well as
under Edmond, depending on the construction given to the subordinate
interpretation. Thus, even if Edmond represents the Court's view of the
Appointments Clause, bankruptcy judges are not entirely immune from
colorable challenge. There are constructions of the "subordinate"
interpretation that favor principal officer status.
Finally, Part V discusses the policy implications of a potential Article
II challenge. It proposes a legislative means of saving bankruptcy judges
prospectively from an appointments challenge. Barring a fix, a challenge
may force the Court to clarify its Appointments Clause jurisprudence.
One possible resolution -acknowledging Morrison as overruled sub
silentio by Edmond-could open the door to a policy innovation under
certain constructions: bankruptcy judges could be granted Article III
tenure while retaining the present method of appointment. In such a
world, Congress could vest the appointment of all inferior Article III
judges in the Courts of Law.
I. THE EVOLVING OFFICE OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Although the Article III judiciary has appointed bankruptcy
adjudicators throughout most of the bench's history, the appointed
officers have steadily accumulated tenure, safeguards against removal,
enlarged jurisdiction, and increasingly significant duties over time. This
brief history of the evolution of bankruptcy judge selection emphasizes
two themes: the continuity in the appointment model, and the dramatic
growth in the appointed officers' significance. These themes provide the
backdrop for this Article's discussion of how a colorable Appointments
Clause challenge to bankruptcy judges as "inferior officers" has become
possible.
A. THE ORIGINS OF APPOINTMENT BY THE COURTS OF LAW
The present method of judicial appointment by the courts of appeals
finds its roots in the earliest federal bankruptcy laws. The predecessors of
the modern bankruptcy judge were the commissioners, registers, and
referees. Congress would later adopt their method of selection-
[Vol. 6o:233
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appointment by the Courts of Law-for the appointment of bankruptcy
judges.
i. Commissioners and the i8oo Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 18oo authorized a federal trial judge to
appoint commissioners to assist in hearing involuntary bankruptcy
petitions filed against merchants and other traders. The judge, in
appointing up to three "good and substantial" individuals,
"commissioned" them to work on a particular bankruptcy, placing them
under oath in a commission extending to a particular named debtor."
These case-by-case commissioners were compensated with an allowance
from the bankruptcy estate . In the event of a vacancy or a
commissioner's refusal to act, the judge could appoint a replacement.29
Commissioners were not judges, or necessarily trained in the law, but
many were "politically connected lawyers and merchants."3 Although
there were no permanent commissions, the courts often appointed a
small number of the same people to "most or all of the commissions in
each jurisdiction," thereby creating a de facto core of commissioners.3' In
1802, Congress stripped the district judges of their authority to appoint
these commissioners,32 and required the judges to direct any future
commission to presidentially appointed "general commissioners of
bankruptcy" for each judicial district.33 Although the Act was to sunset in
1805,3" the Democratic-Republican-dominated Congress repealed it in
1803.35
During the Act's brief span, commissioners performed principally
administrative functions. They exercised the power to, among other
things, have a bankrupt arrested;, 6 take possession of and appraise a
bankrupt's property and inventory;37 notify the public of the bankruptcy,
schedule a meeting of creditors, take evidence of the validity of debts;35
and summon and examine witnesses under oath.39 That commissioners
26. Act of Apr. 4, i8oo, ch. 19, §§ 2-3, 2 Stat. 19, 21-22 (repealed 1803).
27. Id. In case of disagreement among the commissioners, majority rule governed. Id. § 55, 2 Stat.
at 35.
28. See id. § 47, 2 Stat. at 33-
29. Id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 21-22.
30. BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
225 (2002).
31. Id.
32. Act of Apr. 29, 18o2, ch. 31, § 14, 2 Stat. I56, 164 (repealed 1803).
33. Id. The Democratic-Republican Congress, on almost entirely partisan lines, stripped the
Federalist judiciary of its power to appoint commissioners. II ANNALS OF CONG. 981-82 (1802).
34. Act of Apr. 4, 18oo, ch. I9, § 64, 2 Stat. 19,36 (repealed 1803).
35. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
36. Act of Apr. 4, 18oo § 4, 2 Stat. at 22-23.
37. Id. § 5, 2 Stat. at 23.
38. Id. § 6.
39. Id. § 15, 2 Stat. at 25-26.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
handled these important tasks rather than the courts has led more than
one scholar to conclude that Congress recognized "that- the
administrative work of commissioners did not fit comfortably within the
definition of the judicial power of the United States."'4 Indeed,
bankruptcy trustees, and not bankruptcy judges, now handle these
administrative tasks.'
Congress did permit commissioners to perform limited adjudicative
functions, but only with substantial judicial oversight. Commissioners
"made the all-important initial determination of whether the debtor was
in fact a bankrupt,"42 but the debtor could demand a jury trial before a
district judge on the issue. 3 Similarly, commissioners could take evidence
of the validity of creditors' claims," but creditors (or assignees) could
refuse to submit their claims to the commissioners and require a jury trial
in the circuit court for the district.45 Elsewhere, key adjudication was
determined exclusively or predominantly by the court. The estate's
claims against third parties were settled by resort to litigation before a
judge, not before commissioners.46 Further, a judge, and not a
commissioner, could award the debtor a discharge.47
2. Commissioners and the 1841 Act
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 continued the model of judges
appointing adjuncts for bankruptcies, but did not authorize special-
purpose bankruptcy officers. 48 It relied on the court's general statutory
authority to appoint commissioners to take affidavits 49 and authorized
additional evidentiary functions in the bankruptcy context.0 Like their
predecessors, the 1841 commissioners handled largely nonadjudicative
tasks of the sort now managed by bankruptcy trustees.' These included
examining the bankrupt,52 receiving proof of creditors' claims,53 and
taking evidence from other witnesses. 4 The Act specified neither term of
service nor safeguard against removal. Commissioners continued to be
40. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 1 I8 HARV. L. REV. 643, 720 & n.343 (2004).
41. ii U.S.C. §§ 341-351 (2006).
42. MANN, supra note 30.
43. Act of Apr. 4, i8oo § 3, 2 Stat. at 22.
44. id. § 6, 2 Stat. at 23.
45. Id. § 58, 2 Stat. at 35.
46. Id. § 13, 2 Stat. at 25.
47. Id. § 36, 2 Stat. at 31.
48. Act of Aug. i9, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 44o (repealed 1843).
49. Act of Feb. 20, 1812, ch. 25, 2 Stat. 679,679-8I.
5o. Act of Aug. 19, 1841 § 7, 5 Stat. at 446.
5I. See ii U.S.C. §§ 341-35 1 (2006).
52. Act of Aug. 19, 1841 § 4, 5 Stat. at 443-44.
53. Id. §5, 5 Stat. at 444-45.
54. Id. §7, 5 Stat. at 446.
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compensated from the bankrupt's estate, but at a statutorily specified
rate.5
3. Registers and the 1867 Act
The 1867 Act returned to the i8oi model of bankruptcy-specific
adjuncts. It authorized judges to appoint one or more "registers in
bankruptcy" upon the Chief Justice's nomination and recommendation. 6
Unlike the I8oo Act's commissioners, these officers were appointed on a
standing, and not a case-by-case, basis. 7 They enjoyed no safeguard
against removal."
Registers' duties consisted mostly of the same type of administrative
matters previously handled by commissioners and today handled by
bankruptcy trustees." They received the bankrupt's property,
administered oaths, presided at meetings with creditors, took proof of
debts, and generally handled uncontested matters and the administrative
business of bankruptcy. 6'
In addition, the Act denied registers several important powers. They
could not sanction for contempt, or decide any legally or factually
disputed issue, including those questions relating to the allowance or
suspension of a discharge.6' When those matters were raised, the
register's role was simply to have the parties prepare their positions and
then direct them to the court for resolution.
B. DRAMATIC GROWTH IN THE POWER OF THE OFFICE
i. Referees and the 1898 Act
Congress continued to vest the appointment of bankruptcy adjuncts
in the federal trial courts under the 1898 Act.6' These adjunct officers,
now named "referees," grew more powerful over time. They accrued
lengthier terms, safeguards against removal, new duties and jurisdiction.
64
55. Id. § 13, 5 Stat. at 448.
56. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 3, 14 Stat. 517, 518 (repealed 1878).
57. Id. § 3, 14 Stat. at 5t8.
58. Id. § 5, 14 Stat. at 519.
59. See ii U.S.C. §§ 341-351 (2oo6).
6o. Act of Mar. 2, 1867 § 4. 14 Stat. at 519.
6I. Id.
62. Id. The 1874 amendments to the Act did not authorize registers with any additional power,
but reduced their fees, obligated courts to consolidate and simplify registers' duties "to the benefit of
creditors," and imposed an annual reporting requirement. Act of June 22, I874, ch. 390, §§ 18-i9, 18
Stat. 178, 184-85. In 1878, Congress repealed the 1867 Act and its supplementary amendments. Act of
June 7, 1878, ch. 16o, 20 Stat. 99.
63. Act of July I, 1898, ch. 541, § 34, 30 Stat. 544, 555.
64. Id. Although referees were given the title of "judge" by judicial rule from 1973 until they
received the statutory title "judge" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, this Article will refer to the
judicial officers under the 1898 Act as "referees." See FED. R. BANKR. P. 901(7) (repealed Aug. I,
1983). For an interesting discussion of the title change, see Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed:
Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Part Two: The Third Branch Reacts,
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At first, referees served for only two years; were removable at a district
court's discretion either "because their services [were] not needed or for
other cause" ;6s and performed duties that were principally ministerial,
supervisory, and administrative."6 When referees adjudicated, they were
subject to a district judge's review at all times.6" Later, however, Congress
transformed the office of referee into a judicial office requiring legal
training.i It lengthened their terms to six years,"9 limited the grounds for
removal to "incompetency, misconduct, or neglect of duty,"7 replaced
some of the administrative duties with more substantive ones,7' and
authorized jurisdictional referral of matters to them. 2 These duties
assumed still greater significance when the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules
conferred finality on the referees' findings unless "clearly erroneous.""
2. Bankruptcy Judges and the 1978 Act
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 represented a major attempt to
reform an ailing bankruptcy court system. Two principal defects with the
prior court system drove the reform: "the lack of simplicity in
determining jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the low status and
lack of power of the bankruptcy judges which resulted in disrespect for
their position and inability to attract the best caliber judges."'74
The office of bankruptcy judge became much more powerful under
the 1978 Act. The Act granted bankruptcy judges fourteen-year terms,
subject to removal only for enumerated grounds for cause.75 It also
expanded their jurisdiction to grant bankruptcy judges the powers of a
court in law, equity, and admiralty, including the power to grant habeas
corpus petitions. 6 This expanded subject-matter jurisdiction became
even more significant because their orders were self-executing, subject
only to ordinary appellate review.77 As to their duties, bankruptcy judges
were authorized to conduct jury trials.75 Congress withheld only the
power to enjoin another court and hold a party in criminal contempt.
81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 165, 169-71 (2007) [hereinafter Mund, Part Two].
65. Act of July i, 1898 § 34, 30 Stat. at 555.
66. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 8 (977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969. In fact, referees
were not required to be lawyers until 1946. Act of June 28, t946, ch. 512, § 3,60 Stat. 323,324-25.
67. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 8.
68. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 857.
69. Act of June 28, 1946 sec. 2, § 34(a), 6o Stat. at 324.
70. Id. § 34(b). A part-time referee could also be removed if "his services [were] not needed." Id.
71. Id. sec. 39, 52 Stat. at 858-59.
72. Id. sec. 22(a), 52 Stat. at 854; id. sec. 38, 52 Stat. at 857.
73. FED. R. BANKR. P. 810 (repealed 1978).
74. 130 CONG. REC. 20,225 (1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1481, 2256 (1976).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976 & Supp. IV i98o).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 148o (1976).
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Following the recommendation of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 departed from appointments by the Judiciary in favor of
appointments by the President upon Senate confirmation. First, Congress
had reason to doubt the constitutional permissibility of vesting the
appointments of the new proposed bankruptcy judges in the Courts of
Law. Representative Peter Rodino had asked several prominent federal
courts scholars for their views on the two principal competing
bankruptcy proposals, the Commission's Bill (H.R. 31) and so-called
Judges' Bill (H.R. 32).9 Several scholars doubted that the appointments
arrangement proposed in the Judges' Bill, providing for appointment by
the Courts of Law, would be permissible. 8 Congress settled the matter by
rejecting judicial appointment in favor of presidential appointment.8'
Second, appointment by the district judges was perceived as tainted
by political patronage and a lack of independence. District judges tended
to appoint their friends and former associates to the bankruptcy bench."'
In contrast, presidential appointment would promote judicial
independence by avoiding the situation where an "entity that reviewed
the bankruptcy decisions on appeal would have a hand in the selection of
judges."'"
Incumbent bankruptcy referees did not favor this move to a
presidential appointment process. They lacked those political ties that
would permit them to win presidential nomination to the new
bankruptcy judgeships, and they feared replacement by politically well-
connected lawyers.8' For this reason, the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, which had assumed that Article III tenure would
79. Letter from Peter Rodino, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights 63 (Apr. 30, 1976), reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94 th Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 2682-2706 (1975-76) [hereinafter Hearings].
80. See infra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(a) (1976).
82. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Part Three: On the Hill, 8I AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 358-59 (2007) [hereinafter
Mund, Part Three]. Patronage may influence presidential appointments too, but the check of Senate
confirmation mitigates the risk.
83. Id. at 369.
84. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. I, 17, 20-21, 24-25 (2007)
[hereinafter Mund, Part One]; Mund, Part Two, supra note 64, at 166. The National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, which supported appointment by the circuit courts, argued that courts would favor
merit over political connections because presidents from both major political parties had appointed
them. Mund, Part One, supra, at 25 n.78. Of course, the district courts, too, were composed of judges
appointed by various presidents. The difference may be that a U.S. district court is much more likely
than a circuit court to represent the handiwork and input of a senator or senators who spanned several
presidential administrations.
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necessitate presidential appointment and confirmation, was initially
reluctant about the House's insistence on Article III status.
85
Perhaps as a concession to the incumbent bankruptcy referees as
well as a recognition of the practical difficulties involved in appointing an
entire new slate of bankruptcy judges all at once, the 1978 Act provided
for a period of transition from the system of referees appointed by the
district courts to the system of bankruptcy judges appointed by the
President with advice and consent. 86 Rather than create the new courts
immediately, the Act, which provided for bankruptcy judges to replace
the referees, contemplated a transition period spanning almost five-and-
a-half years, during which time they would exercise the newly authorized
jurisdiction and duties. Each referee (bankruptcy judge) continued to
serve for the remainder of the appointed term unless found not qualified
by the Chief Judge of the circuit.87 Bankruptcy referees serving on
November 6, 1978, were extended until March 31, 1984 as bankruptcy
judges.8 The bankruptcy courts created by section 152 were not to come
into existence until the expiration of the transition period, on April I,
I 9 84 ."' The President would eventually appoint replacements or
reappoint the incumbent bankruptcy judges.
In 1982, during this transition, the Supreme Court struck down the
broad, new jurisdictional statute that was the centerpiece of
congressional reform efforts.' In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., the Court held that Congress had violated
Article III by vesting the essential power of the judicial branch in judges
who lacked Article III tenure and salary protection. 9' The bankruptcy
court neither fell into any exception for Article I courts nor qualified as
an adjunct to an Article III court.92 Because the jurisdictional statute was
not severable from the rest of the Act, the Court struck down the whole
arrangement. 9 The Court had no occasion to address any Article I
challenge to the appointment of transition judges. Moreover, the
bankruptcy judges to be appointed after the transition period would have
presented no Appointments Clause difficulty. They were to be appointed
by the President with Senate confirmation.
Congress failed to act promptly to create a new bankruptcy court
structure. Initially, the Court stayed its judgment until October 4, 1982,
85. Mund, Part One, supra note 84, at 29; Mund, Part Three, supra note 82, at 356.
86. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 401-41 t, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682-88
(codified in scattered sections of i i U.S.C.).
87. Id. § 4 02(b), 92 Stat. at 2682.
88. Id.
89. Id.
9o. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
91. Id. at 87.
92. Id. at 73-76.
93. Id. at 87 n.40; see also id. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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and then extended its stay until December 25, 1982, to give Congress the
necessary time to react.94 When Congress failed to legislate, the Court
refused to stay its judgment any further.95 Instead, district courts adopted
emergency rules to address the exigencies of running a workable (and
constitutional) bankruptcy system. The former bankruptcy referees,
who were to exercise the powers of the new bankruptcy court judges,
were to remain in place only through the expiration of the transition
period on March 31, 1984, unless reappointed.' Corgress, however, had
still failed to restructure the bankruptcy courts by the transition period's
end. As a patch, it extended successively the terms of the then-serving
officers, until June 27, L984.0 Congress finally passed a new court
structure with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act'
("BAFJA"), which President Reagan signed into law on July IO, 1984,
shortly after the expiration of the last stopgap extension.
3. Bankruptcy Judges and BAFJA to the Present
Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act, Congress abandoned the 1978 Act's use of the default appointments
process. It returned to appointment by the Courts of Law,"° as had been
done with commissioners, registers, and referees.'"' On June 27 to 28,
1984, the staff attorneys for the conferees for the House and Senate
worked out a tardy compromise to vest the courts of appeals with the
authority to appoint the bankruptcy judges. 2
The delay in reaching this new consensus resulted in immediate
court challenges to BAFJA. The thirteen-day hiatus between the expiry
of the last extension statute and the President's signing of BAFJA (June
27, 1984 to July IO, 1984) precipitated Appointments Clause challenges
nationwide.' 3 BAFJA had provided for a further transition period with
judges' terms to expire on October I, 1986, or four years after the date of
94. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982) (staying judgment
until December 24, 1982).
95. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 1094 (1982) (declining to stay
judgment any longer).
96. See, e.g., In re Benny, 812 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9 th Cir. 1987) (citing N.D. Cal. Gen. Order 24
(Dec. 27, 1982 , effective Dec. 25, 1982)).
97. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, No. 95-598, § 404(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2683.
98. Act of Mar. 31, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (extended to Apr. 30, 1984); Act of Apr.
30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (extended to May 25, 1984); Act of June 20, 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (extended to June 27, 1984).
99. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(amending scattered sections of i i U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(i) (2oo6).
Ilo. See supra notes 26,48, 56, 63 and accompanying text.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(i).
1O3. See, e.g., Koerner v. Colonial Bank (In re Koerner), 8oo F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1986)
(upholding the retroactive extension of bankruptcy judges' terms of office).
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their last appointment to that office, whichever was later. 4 In one of
these cases, In re Benny, an involuntary bankrupt, joined by the U.S.
Justice Department and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, '
argued that the thirteen-day lapse in the office and then BAFJA's
retroactive extension of the bankruptcy judges then-serving effected
unconstitutional congressional reappointments of the judges in violation
of the Appointments Clause. °6 Congress was effectively appointing
judges by retroactively extending their terms in a lapsed office and
granting the office new powers. Significantly, these In re Benny-type
challenges did not question-as this Article now does-whether
bankruptcy judges constituted "inferior officers" such that their initial
appointments by the courts of appeals would offend the Appointments
Clause.
BAFJA greatly enhanced the office of bankruptcy judge from the
day of bankruptcy referees, retreating only minimally from the apex of
power proposed by the 1978 Act. Bankruptcy judges hold their offices
for fourteen years'" and may be removed only for limited grounds."'
They exercise considerable power and independence to resolve "core"
proceedings, entering final orders that are subject only to appellate
review by the district court.'" With respect to non-core proceedings,
bankruptcy judges exercise authority akin to magistrate judges. In core
and non-core proceedings alike, they may exercise power over any party
located within the country or who may have minimum contacts with it."0
They were given broad equitable powers in exercising their jurisdiction."'
Notwithstanding the great power of these new officers, several
concerns animated BAFJA's return to the earlier model of appointment
by the Courts of Law, specifically the courts of appeals. First, partisan
politics and the prospect of court packing favored the decision to vest the
104. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 § io6(a), 98 Stat. at 342; id.
§ 121, 98 Stat. at 345-46.
lo5. For its part, the Administrative Office, which believed the legislative extension of terms
without a new appointment to be unconstitutional, refused to pay those judges sitting with extended
terms. In re Benny, 812 F.2d J133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1987). Eventually, it relented. Id.
io6. Id. The Office of Legal Counsel viewed these retroactive extensions as congressional
reappointments. A presidential signing statement noted this reservation with the term extension.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 10io, ionI
(July Io, 1984). The statement said nothing, however, about BAFJA's classification of bankruptcy
judges as "inferior officers" or the permissibility of vesting their appointments in the courts of appeals.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(i) (2006).
Io8. Id. § i52(e).
109. Id. § 157(b)(I).
i o. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
Ill. ii U.S.C. § Io5(a) (2006); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S. Ct. II05, 1111-12
(2007). For some illustrations of the expansive exercise of equity, see Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the
Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power Under Section io5 of the Bankruptcy Code: The All Writs Act
and an Admonition from Chief Justice Marshall, 35 ARiz. ST. L.J. 793,794 (2003).
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appointment power in the Article III courts. Post-Marathon, Congress
was confronted with a need to appoint a large number of bankruptcy
judges."2 That meant that in 1984 President Ronald Reagan and a
Republican-controlled Senate would dominate the appointments
process. But the authorization for new bankruptcy judgeships could
become law only with House cooperation. Democrats, who controlled
the House, were concerned that a Republican President and Senate
would cut them out of the default confirmation process and pack the
bankruptcy bench with party loyalists. They
question[ed] whether the appointment of more than 200 new article 3
judges, with all of the attendant privileges, including lifetime tenure, by
the President would result in anything other than a new permanently
irreducible court system dominated by conservative white male
appointees insensitive to civil rights and labor issues and to the needs
of poor and minority citizens.
3
Thus, "Presidential appointment would decrease the pool of applicants
realistically eligible to be chosen.... [O]nly those applicants active in the
President's party are likely to be chosen.""..4
Second, the bankruptcy judges had disfavored presidential
appointment for self-serving, nonpartisan political reasons. Unlike
district judges and other judicial officers appointed by the President,
bankruptcy judges were not well connected politically."5 They had
favored merit selection by the circuit courts in the past over presidential
selection because they estimated their chance of reappointment to be
superior when not in a footrace with well-connected friends of U.S.
senators and the President."6
Why were the appointments given to the courts of appeals rather
than the district courts? Some district judges may have been nursing
lingering hard feelings toward incumbent bankruptcy judges seeking
reappointment. The earlier 1977 Conference Report to H.R. 8200
disclosed the pettiness of some district court judges toward bankruptcy
judges' efforts to secure greater tenure and independence. "Feeling
among the district benches is running high against bankruptcy judges for
their role in the formulation of this legislation. There has been some fear
that retaliation may take the form of unrenewed appointments of sitting
bankruptcy judges."" 7 Section 404(b) of H.R. 82oo addressed this
concern by providing "that the terms of all bankruptcy judges sitting on
the date of enactment of the legislation are extended to the end of the
112. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
113. 130 CONG. REc. 6246 (1984) (statement of Rep. Crockett, Jr.).
114. Id. at 6046 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
115. Mund, Part One, supra note 84, at 20-21.
iI6. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
I 17. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 46o (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6415.
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transition period.""..8 These same considerations may have informed the
congressional choice to give the circuit courts, and not the district courts,
the power to appoint new judges.
Cast in public-regarding terms, the need to reach a broader pool of
bankruptcy judicial applicants also favored vesting the circuit courts with
the appointment power. Prior to the 1978 Act, district courts appointed
the bankruptcy judges/referees."9 That arrangemeitt would tend to favor
appointees familiar to the district judges, namely, those attorneys drawn
from the talent pool of the judicial district's bankruptcy bar. Circuit-wide
selection, however, permitted the casting of a wider geographic net for
qualified applicants. This arrangement would partially make up for a lost,
even if largely theoretical, advantage of presidential appointment,
namely that the appointed judges would be drawn from a national talent
pool. As Representative Robert Kastenmeier explained, the political
logic of bankruptcy judicial appointments differs from the context of
other judicial appointments:
Presidential appointment works well for district and circuit judges,
because many qualified lawyers are willing to serve, the range and
importance of issues to be handled makes it appropriate to consider a
potential judge's political philosophy, and the large impact and high
visibility that an individual judge can have induces the President to
choose a well-qualified candidate. The same conditions do not exist
with respect to bankruptcy judgeships. There is not a huge pool of
obviously qualified candidates, and the President does not have as
strong an incentive to choose the best qualified of those candidates.'20
Kastenmeier held the view that the courts of appeals would principally
consider merit for the specialist position and "choose the best qualified
candidate regardless of political affiliation ....
Finally, Marathon may have given Congress some cause to rethink
presidential appointment.' Marathon had struck down the broad grant
of jurisdiction to non-Article III judges by holding that the 1978 Act had
thereby granted the "essential attributes" of the Article III judicial
power to bankruptcy judges.'23 These bankruptcy judges were not subject
to sufficient control by the Article III judiciary to be considered
adjuncts.'24 Marathon suggested that better Article III control of the
bankruptcy judges could save their constitutionality by strengthening the
claim that they were merely adjuncts to the district courts.' 5 Although
118. Id. at 459-60.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
120. 130 CONG. REC. 6046 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
121. Id.
122. See 458 U.S. 5o, 87 (1982).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 85-86.
125. See id. at 79, 85-86.
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presidential appointment with Senate confirmation was constitutionally
permissible, the vesting of appointments in the Courts of Law would
make the bankruptcy judges more subject to supervision and avoid a
repeat performance of Marathon.I"6 District judges had appointed
commissioners, registers, and referees previously. That selection method
had provided a means to control the non-life tenured officers and had
helped assure that the bankruptcy judges were true adjuncts to the
Article III judiciary. I"7 Of course, the power to remove and the threat of
its exercise have always been more significant as tools of control than the
power to appoint. Congress could have granted the circuit courts the
power to remove these judicial officers while leaving the appointment
power with the President and the Senate. This concern may have been
only secondary to the immediate partisan and constituent politics.
Since BAFJA, Congress has continued to enhance the office of
bankruptcy judge by adding to its powers. Among others, it clarified a
judge's power to raise issues sua sponte;"'  authorized jury trials before
bankruptcy judges upon the parties' consent, and when designated by the
district court;2 9 and authorized the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity in some instances.'30
The circuit courts have continued to appoint bankruptcy judges post-
BAFJA. By statute, they must select judges according to a merit-
selection plan: "a person whose character, experience, ability, and
impartiality qualify such person to serve in the Federal judiciary. ' '.3.
Applicants must "possess, and have a reputation for, integrity and good
character"; a demonstrated "commitment to equal justice under the law";
and a good judicial temperament, as reflected by their "demeanor,
character, and personality.' '32  In addition, the court disqualifies
applicants whose appointments would violate nepotism/familial conflict
of interest rules and who are not "of sound physical and mental health"
sufficient to perform the essential duties of the office.'33
126. G. Ray Warner, Rotten to the "Core": An Essay on Juries, Jurisdiction and Granfinanciera, 59
UMKC L. REV. 991 , 996 (I99I).
127. Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1, 14 (1995).
128. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-554, sec. 203, § Io5(a), ioo Stat. 3088, 3097.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (2o06).
130. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104, io8 Stat. 41o6, 40o8; id. § 112,
io8 Stat. at 4117; id. § 113, io8 Stat. at 4117.
131. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 12o(a)(I),
98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 152 nt. (2oo6)). For a discussion of the permissibility
of using statutory qualifications in vested appointments, see Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two
Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, IO U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2oo8).
132. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 § 120(c), 98 Stat. at 333
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 152 nt.).
133. Id.
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How does the appointments process actually function?'34 Most
searches result in the appointment of an attorney drawn from the pool of
the local bankruptcy bar.'35 Once appointed, odds for reappointment at
the end of the fixed fourteen-year term are good. During 1998 to 2002,
circuit courts reappointed over 90% of those bankruptcy judges applying
for reappointment.,
6
II. OPTING OUT OF NOMINATION AND ADVICE AND CONSENT
The requirements of the Appointments Clause and its excepting
provision provide the basis for a possible challenge to the present
method of appointing bankruptcy judges. Part II briefly discusses the
Clause's operation.
A. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Article II, section 2, clause 2, provides that
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.'37
The first half of the clause describes the obligatory method for
appointing "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court," and other "principal" officers of the United
States.'35 The President nominates, the Senate confirms, and then the
President may appoint. This arrangement was a political bargain between
those who favored the vesting of the appointment power in the President
alone and those who preferred senatorial appointment."'
The Appointments Clause, however, serves a purpose beyond the
expediency of a founding-era political compromise. The Court has
repeatedly claimed that the Clause is not a "frivolous" matter of
"etiquette or protocol," but represents an important separation-of-
134. The informal process behind the selection of bankruptcy judges, including the differences in
process among circuits and the campaigns run by applicants seeking appointment, is a topic fit for
another article.
135. LYNN M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETrION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING ThE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20 (2006).
136. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
138. The Clause itself does not use the "principal" nomenclature. James Madison employed this
term in a discussion of the Clause during the Virginia ratifying convention. See infra notes 162-64 and
accompanying text.
139. MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES 21-22 (2004).
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powers safeguard.4 ° "This power of distributing appointments, as
circumstances may require, into several hands, in a well formed
disinterested legislature, might be of essential service, not only in
promoting beneficial appointments, but, also, in preserving the balance
in government .... "" Nomination by a sole President with Senate
advice and consent makes credit and blame for nominations politically
clear, and promotes excellent and politically acceptable appointees
because of the "silent operation" of the Senate's advice and consent.'42
Moreover, presidential nomination and appointment, together with the
Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses,'43 prevent Congress from
creating offices and then appointing themselves or friends to them.'"
Thus, the Clause serves the separation of powers.
B. THE EXCEPTING CLAUSE
The excepting provision of the Appointments Clause, occasionally
referred to as the "Excepting Clause," authorizes Congress to opt out of
the default constitutional arrangement for appointment.'45 "Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments."'' 6 Congress may elect, either by statutory enactment with
presidential concurrence or by legislative supermajority without it,'47 to
vest the appointing power in the enumerated recipients. '  When
Congress exercises this power, it excludes itself from the default
appointments process by stripping the Senate of its confirmation
authority. In addition, the choice to use this power may, depending on its
exercise, divest the President of the appointment power.
Congressional discretion to permit intrabranch appointments is
broad.'49 Language parallel to "as they think proper" in other parts of the
140. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (976) (per curiam).
141. Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican No. 14 (Jan. I7, 1788). reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS' CONsTrrUtoN 98 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2ooi).
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
144. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 904 n.4 (1990 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The provision was a constitutional innovation in its time. No
state constitution at the time of the Philadelphia Convention provided any model for the Excepting
Clause.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
547. Cain v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (N.D. IlI. 1947) (noting Congress exercises this
option by means of "specific legislation").
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
149. The scope of discretion to authorize interbranch appointments is disputable. There are two
competing interpretations of the discretion encompassed by the phrase "as they think proper." First,
the phrase could mean Congress enjoys not only the discretion to choose whether or not to vest the
appointing power, but also the unfettered discretion in selecting who receives that appointing
authority. On this account, "as they think proper" introduces a menu of available appointing
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Constitution illustrates this discretion. The grants of discretion in the
Presidential Adjournment Clause' and the Slave Trade Clause'5'
"expressly make a political actor's judgment, rather than objective
necessity, propriety, or expediency, the test of constitutionality.""'52
Not all officers, are discretionarily eligible to be so appointed. The
Excepting Clause extends only to "inferior officers," that subclass of
officers of the United States who are not listed in the Clause and who are
"inferior." If Congress attempts to exempt a principal officer-i.e., a
noninferior officer -from the default process, litigants may challenge the
appointment's constitutionality. Thus, defining who is an "inferior"
officer is important to avoid constitutional difficulties.
As a threshold matter, to be an "inferior" officer, one must be an
officer, judicially defined as "any appointee exercising significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."'53 There are two
principal competing interpretations of the ambiguous term "inferior" in
the Excepting Clause.'54 First, "inferior" may describe the relationship of
a subordinate to a superior.'55 The original meaning, which was followed
in Edmond v. United States, favors this interpretation.' Second,
"inferior" may carry "the sense of petty or unimportant.' ' 57 Morrison v.
Olson,'5 discussed below, embodies this approach.
authorities. Such an interpretation would permit interbranch as well as intrabranch appointments, such
as the Courts of Law appointing executive officers. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98
(1879) ("[T]he selection of the appointing power, as between the functionaries named, is a matter
resting in the discretion of Congress."). Second, the phrase could be construed to permit only the more
limited congressional discretion over the choice whether and when to opt out of the default method
for appointment. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 278 n.36 (993). Such an
interpretation would not allow Congress to give appointing authorities the appointment power over an
"inferior officer outside their own respective departments." Id. Congress would enjoy the discretion to
vest an executive branch appointment, for example, in either the President alone, or the Heads of
Departments, but would not be permitted to give the President alone the authority to appoint judges.
150. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. i.
152. Lawson & Granger, supra note 149, at 278.
153. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125-26 (1976) (per curiam). This definition does not draw "the
line between principal and inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes, but ... the line between
officer and non officer." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997).
154. In addition, the use of "inferior" may carry a "merely ceremonial meaning"-one that that
does not necessarily describe a hierarchical relationship and does not signify unimportance. In re
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1988). This meaning has often been conflated with the
"lesser" definition of "inferior." See id.
155. See, e.g., Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.
156. ld. at 663.
157. Collins v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 568, 574 (1879).
158. See 487 U.S. 654,671-72 (1988).
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i. The Original Meaning of "Inferior Officer"
An originalist interpretation of the Excepting Clause favors the
subordinate interpretation. The text, structure, purpose, and historical
practice reflect an understanding that the word "inferior" denoted a
hierarchical relationship with a "superior."
a. Constitutional Text
The text of the Constitution favors the interpretation that "inferior"
describes a hierarchical relationship between a subordinate and a
superior. Other occurrences of the word in the Constitution include the
enumerated power to constitute "Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court";59 the vesting of the judicial power in the "supreme Court" and
"in such inferior Courts" as Congress may authorize; '6° and the
description of the terms of office for "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts."' 6' Similarly interpreted, "inferior officers" in the
Excepting Clause would permit appointment of those officers who are
subordinate to a hierarchical superior.
The records of the Virginia ratification convention support the
subordinate interpretation. James Madison explained the Excepting
Clause's operation. 6 , "With respect to the appointment of [inferior]
officers, a law may be made to grant it to the President alone."' 6 He
referred to these inferior officers as "subordinate officers," in
contradistinction to the "principal offices," which the President would fill
temporarily with his recess appointments power.' 6' His views provide
evidence of how a reasonable person in the ratification era might have
understood the word "inferior."
Contextually analogous usage in The Federalist confirms that
"inferior" should be interpreted as "subordinate." The Federalist Nos. 8i
and 82 provide an exegesis of the only other constitutional occurrences
of the word "inferior." Hamilton responded in Federalist No. 81 to an
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
i6o. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
161. Id.
162. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 409-10 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1876) [hereinafter THE DEBATES]. Madison's
statements came in the context of his explanation why appointment matters would not likely detain
the Senate. An interlocutor had voiced concern about the provision for adjournment of the Congress.
Madison explained that the Senate would not abuse the requirement that "[n]either House... shall,
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4,
because the Senate discharges only two duties not shared with the House: providing advice and
consent for treaties and appointments. THE DEBATES, supra.
63. THE DEBATES, supra note 162, at 409. The bracketed word "inferior" is properly implied
because the officer would have to be "inferior" in order for Congress to vest the appointment in the
President alone. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 2.
164. THE DEBATES, supra note 162 (emphasis added).
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attack on the scope of congressional power to create "inferior" courts.'
65
A ratification opponent had claimed that the power to establish national
"inferior courts" was "intended to abolish all the county courts in the
several states, which are commonly called inferior courts."'6 Hamilton
rebuffed the suggestion by emphasizing the subordinate usage of
"inferior."
[T]he expressions of the constitution are to constitute 'tribunals
inferior to the supreme court,' and the evident design of the provision is
to enable the institution of local courts subordinate to the supreme,
either in states or larger districts. It is ridiculous to imagine that county
courts were in contemplation.
6
,
This explanation, which distinguishes between the U.S. courts that are
hierarchically inferior to the Supreme Court and state courts that
happened to be styled "inferior," underscores that the use of "inferior"
elsewhere in the Constitution was used to describe a relationship
between a subordinate and a superior. Similarly, Hamilton equated
inferior with subordinate in The Federalist No. 82.' 8 "[Tlhe supreme and
subordinate courts of the union should alone have the power of deciding
those causes, to which their authority is to extend...."'6, To be sure,
"inferior" carried also the sense of "[f]ower in place[,] ... station or rank
of life[,] ... value or excellency.' 7 ° The Federalist includes several
occurrences of this usage of "inferior,"''7' but the contextually parallel
usages invoke the meaning "subordinate."
b. Structure and Purpose
The structure and purpose of the Excepting Clause lend support to
the subordinate interpretation of "inferior." The Excepting Clause does
not stand apart structurally from the Appointments Clause, but is an
exception to it. The default rule attempts to preserve accountability for
appointments by vesting the nomination in a single President. It limits
presidential appointment power by granting the Senate a role in the
selection process. These related objectives permit several inferences
about the scope of the Excepting Clause.
The Excepting Clause, as an exception to the Appointments Clause,
should not be interpreted to undermine the default appointment
arrangement or otherwise work a dramatic departure from it. Its
165. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 142, at 420.
166. Id.
167. Id. n.* (second emphasis added).
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 142, at 427.
169. Id.
170. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).
171. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 142, at 357 ("In this
article, therefore, the power of the president would be inferior to that of either the monarch, or the
governor." (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 6o:233
December 2008] BANKRUPTCY JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
principal purpose was to promote administrative efficiency by facilitating
the appointment of numerous subordinates.
[F]orseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals
necessary, [Senate advice and consent] might be inconvenient, it was
provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially
mentioned, Congress might by law vest their appointment in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.'72
That little debate followed the last-minute amendment to the
Appointments Clause compromise suggests it did not attempt a dramatic
departure from the default rule. During the last day of the Federal
Convention, Gouvernour Morris, seconded by Roger Sherman, proposed
amending the Appointments Clause in the Committee on Style.'73
Significantly, Morris and Sherman were the architects of the compromise
that resulted in the default appointments process. Morris represented the
interests of the "large" or populous states, which favored presidential
appointment; Sherman represented the interests of the small states,
which favored senatorial appointment.'74 James Madison suggested the
proposed Excepting Clause did "not go far enough if it be necessary at
all."'75 He proposed a friendly amendment, adding "superior officers"
below the Heads of Departments to the Excepting Clause's enumerated
recipients of the appointments power., 6 Madison's proposed use of the
word "superior" together with "inferior officer" could be read to suggest
that the meaning "subordinate" was intended. Morris replied that
Madison's proposed change to his amendment was unnecessary and
offered that "[b]lank commissions [could] be sent."'77 By this, Morris was
(apparently) suggesting that commissions, which give a person a right to
an office, could be left undesignated (i.e., "blank") by the formally
appointing authority. Thus, Morris contemplated that the Clause would
permit a Head of Department-who would retain formal authority over
the appointment-to leave to an officer below the actual selection of a
named officeholder. Initially, the amendment failed on a tie vote.'
Subsequently, after argument that the Excepting Clause was "too
necessary to be omitted," it was adopted on a second vote without
172. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
173. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966); see
also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Nobody thought [the
Excepting Clause] was a fundamental change .... ").
174. COMISKEY, supra note 139. The "large" or populous states anticipated wielding greater
influence in the selection of a President under the electoral college. Id. The "small" or not-so-
populous states anticipated such an outcome too and therefore favored the Senate's egalitarian two-
votes-per-state approach to representation. Id.
175. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 173.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. The vote was five, five, one. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Madison's proposed change and without opposition.'79 Thus, the
Excepting Clause "was intended merely to make clear (what Madison
thought already was clear) that those officers appointed by the President
with Senate approval could on their own appoint their subordinates."' 8
The Appointments Clause's purpose of political accountability
favors the subordinate interpretation. The Excepting Clause, like the
Appointments Clause, serves political accountability by permitting the
vesting of appointment power in one person (e.g., the President alone or
the Heads of Departments) or in a small numbers of persons (e.g., the
Courts of Law). If the vested appointment authority is interpreted to
extend only to appointing subordinates-such as appointees within the
same branch of government who themselves are responsible to the
appointing authority-political accountability for poor or excellent
appointees is furthered.
Similarly, the Appointments Clause's purpose of limiting
presidential power favors the subordinate interpretation of "inferior."
Although the Excepting Clause does not provide for a case-by-case
senatorial check, it does require that the Senate and the House authorize
"by law" (i.e., by legislation) the vesting of appointments. The
subordinate interpretation further checks the presidential appointment
power by disallowing vested cross-branch appointments of judicial
officers. If the President alone could be given the power to appoint lower
judicial officers, that exception would undo the careful compromise that
created the Appointments Clause. Of course, the vesting of the
appointment of executive officers in the Courts of Law would check the
exercise of executive power, but such an arrangement would undermine
the purpose of promoting clear lines of political accountability for poor
appointments.
c. Contemporaneous Historical Practice
The historical evidence of early appointment practice favors the
subordinate interpretation. Each time the First Congress opted out of the
default appointment regime, the appointed office was subordinate to the
principal one. For example, in drafting the organic statute of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Congress created the office of "Secretary
for the Department of Foreign Affairs," which it denominated as a
"principal" office. 8, It then created the office of "chief Clerk in the
Department of Foreign Affairs" and denominated it an "inferior office"
to be filled by the principal officer's appointee."2 The statute then
179. Id. at 628.
i8o. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720-21 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
18i. An Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of
Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, § I, 1 Stat. 28, 29 (789).
182. Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 29.
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defined the duties of the office of chief clerk as "to be employed therein
as [the principal officer] shall deem proper.'5 83 Congress followed a
parallel pattern in creating the Department of War, 84 Department of the
Treasury,' and the Judiciary.'8 Each act authorized principal and
inferior offices, with the inferior office answering as a subordinate to the
principal. Thus, contemporaneous historical practice favors the
subordinate interpretation.
2. The Court's Interpretations of "Inferior Officer"
Two landmark Supreme Court cases have adopted competing
interpretations of "inferior." Morrison v. Olson interpreted "inferior
officer" as one with "lesser" power and duties.' 7 Edmond v. United States
interpreted "inferior officer" as one who is "subordinate" to a
supervisor."
a. The Lesser Interpretation
Morrison v. Olson occupies a leading place in the separation of
powers canon generally, and in Appointments Clause jurisprudence
specifically. The independent counsel provisions at issue were the
product of a dramatic Nixon-era standoff. In 1978, Congress passed the
Ethics in Government Act following the attempted Watergate cover-up
and President Richard Nixon's resignation.' 9 Nixon had wielded his
executive power to thwart the efforts of Justice Department prosecutors
seeking evidence of criminal misconduct by high-level executive branch
officers. He had asserted executive privilege over White House
audiotapes sought by special prosecutor Archibald Cox.'" Nixon, as head
Executive, ordered his subordinate, Attorney General Elliott
Richardson, to fire Cox. 9' Rather than obey, Richardson and then
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus resigned.'92 Solicitor
General Robert Bork, the ranking Justice Department official, obliged
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. An Act to Establish an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of War,
ch. 7, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 49,49-50 (1789).
185. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § i, i Stat. 65 (1789). The organic act of
the Treasury Department did not explicitly call the Secretary of the Treasury a "principal officer."
However, it created the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (appointable by the
Secretary), and did make that office subordinate to the Secretary. Id.
I86. The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted the courts the power to appoint their clerks. An Act to
Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 7, s Stat. 73, 76 (1789). Their oath suggests
they are subordinates of the Court. Id.
187. 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988).
I88. 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997).
189. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
I9o. In Nixon v. United States, the Supreme Court ordered Nixon to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum for the now-infamous Nixon tapes. 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974).
I91. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 1973, at AI.
192. Id.
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the head Executive and fired Cox.'93 Nixon's highly visible efforts to
scuttle the prosecution led to tremendous political pressure for him to
reappoint a new special prosecutor and, eventually, to resign in the
shadow of a credible impeachment threat.
Notwithstanding Nixon's resignation, Congress sought to guarantee
the independence of future investigations of high-ranking executive
branch officers by creating an office of independent counsel: a special
prosecutor appointed by Article III judges with decisional independence
from the executive hierarchy.' By design and definition, the
independent counsel was subordinate neither to the President nor to any
other officer.'95 This arrangement presented an Appointments Clause
difficulty. If the independent counsel was not subordinate to anyone,
how could she be an "inferior" officer appointed pursuant to the
Excepting Clause'?
Morrison interpreted "inferior officer" in the sense of an officer who
is "lesser," or less powerful, in the abstract, than principal officers."9
Chief Justice Rehnquist justified this conclusion by borrowing from and
adapting prior cases that distinguished between "officers" and
nonofficers. These decisions balanced tenure, duration, emolument, and
duties to determine whether criminal defendants were "officers" within
the meaning of federal criminal statutes. '9 Morrison adapted the
balancing test. It substituted "removeability" and "jurisdiction" as
factors to be considered in lieu of "emolument" and "duration.""' It then
balanced the factors to distinguish principal from inferior officers and
thereby justified "inferior" officer status for the independent counsel."9
193. Id.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 591 (2006).
195. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988). The Attorney General could remove an
independent counsel only upon good cause shown or physical or mental incapacity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 596(a)(i). The independent counsel argued that this provision made the counsel subordinate to an
executive superior. Brief for Appellant at 36, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279).
The Court declined to find that a provision allowing for removal for cause rendered the independent
counsel subordinate to the Attorney General.
196. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-73.
197. For example, in United States v. Hartwell, the Court balanced tenure, duration, emolument,
and duties to determine whether a criminal defendant was subject to indictment under a public anti-
corruption statute that applied only to "officers." 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1867). Similarly, in United
States v. Germaine, the Court balanced these same considerations to conclude an army doctor was not
an officer. 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878).
198. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72.
199. Justice Scalia observed that the balancing in the criminal law cases sought only to distinguish
between officers and nonofficers. Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This observation may overlook a
charitable reading of the majority that it supposed a spectrum between principal officer and nonofficer
with the inferior officer located somewhere along the continuum. It remains that the independent
counsel never characterized Hartwell or Germaine as offering a test that could sort principal officers
from inferior ones. Brief for Appellant at 36, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279). She did argue it
appropriate to examine the duties, powers, tenure, and compensation assigned to an office by
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Accordingly, the Court held that her appointment comported with the
Excepting Clause.2"
Justice Scalia dissented, and argued that, in light of the separation of
powers, the subordinate interpretation of "inferior" was correct.2"' He
would have concluded the independent counsel was not "inferior."
Morrison was not subordinate to any superior executive officer. This
independence would disallow appointment pursuant to the Excepting
Clause. Scalia would later suggest a per se rule that being removable at
will renders an officer subordinate to the officer with power to remove."'
The decision's consequences reached further than the Appointments
Clause. His solo dissent criticized the appointment and the restriction on
removal as undermining the unitary Executive's ability to appoint and
control officers exercising the executive power. 3 A restriction on
removal thereby interfered with the separation of powers.
b. The Subordinate Interpretation
Less than ten years later, the subordinate interpretation of "inferior"
officer, expressed in Scalia's Morrison dissent, prevailed in Edmond v.
United States.2 04 Criminal defendants questioned the validity of the
appointments of the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Appeals who
had affirmed their military convictions. 5 The defendants argued the
executive branch adjudicators constituted principal officers, and that
therefore the Appointments Clause required presidential nomination
with Senate advice and consent."' Assuming the validity of Morrison's
interpretation of "inferior" as "lesser," they emphasized the importance
of the judges' responsibilities-including the ability to affirm death
sentences -and argued that the judges were neither limited in tenure nor
in jurisdiction.2"
The Court brushed aside Morrison as "not purport[ing] to set forth a
definitive test for whether an office [was] 'inferior...... Instead, it adopted
the subordinate interpretation." It noted that being a powerful officer
does not preclude one from being "inferior" under the subordinate
interpretation."0 The exercise of "significant authority" separates only
Congress to determine whether an officer was inferior. Id. at 33.
200. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
201. Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (997).
203. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
205. Id. at 655-56.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 661-62.
2o8. Id. at 661.
209. Id. at 662.
210. Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
officers from nonofficers, not principal from inferior ones."' Inferior
officers too may exercise significant authority of the United States,
provided they are subordinate to an appointing superior."' This decision
was surprising because Edmond did not overrule Morrison-at least not
explicitly, yet it adopted Scalia's interpretation of "inferior" as
subordinate.
III. THREE NARRATIVES ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORRISON
AND EDMOND
Morrison and Edmond's uneasy coexistence has not gone unnoticed
by the lower courts and commentators. Several courts have observed a
"tension" between the two cases." 3 Other courts and commentators,
perhaps recognizing them as irreconcilable, preferred one decision to
another. A Ninth Circuit panel followed Morrison while failing to
acknowledge Edmond; 4 another attempted to reconcile them.' A
leading student treatise on constitutional law mentions Morrison but
neglects to mention Edmond. Justice Souter too concurred separately
in Edmond to protest the departure from Morrison."' On the other hand,
Professor Steven Calabresi has characterized Edmond as "essentially
displac[ing] the faulty Appointments Clause analysis of Morrison v.
Olson." Below, this Article offers three alternative narratives that
attempt to explain the relationship between Morrison and Edmond, and
their competing interpretations of "inferior officer."
A. THE RECONCILING NARRATIVE
Courts have attempted to reconcile Morrison and Edmond as
consistent. To accomplish this feat, they appeal to the distinction
between necessary and sufficient conditions. The Ninth Circuit first
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3 d 19, 25 (Ist Cir. 2000); United States v. Sotomayor Vazquez,
69 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (D.P.R. 1999).
214. See Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 F.3 d 653, 659-6o (9th Cir. 2007) (failing to acknowledge Edmond
and applying Morrison).
215. United States v. Gantt, 179 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 194 F.3d 987, 999 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1999).
216. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (3d ed. 2007); see also
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 1163
(3 d ed. 2003) (noting Edmond in the case book but failing to acknowledge any tension or
inconsistency with Morrison).
217. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 667-69 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter wrote separately because
he disagreed with the majority's analysis of the Appointments Clause issue. Although he viewed
subordination as a necessary condition to "inferior officer status," he did not consider it "a single
sufficient condition." Id. at 668.
218. Steven G. Calabresi, The Structural Constitution and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 3, 5 (1998); see also Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?
The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1119-20 (1998).
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suggested this approach in United States v. Gantt.219 Gantt addressed
whether an interim U.S. Attorney constituted an "inferior officer" such
that Congress could vest the appointment in the U.S. District Court.22
On the one hand, it rejected subordination as the necessary condition for
inferior officer status, and thereby accounted for Morrison: an officer
could be deemed inferior, even without any superior, if the discretionary
balancing of factors warranted it.2 ' On the other hand, Gantt
acknowledged that a superior officer's supervision guarantees, or
suffices, to make one an inferior officer. 2" This reconciliation explains
partially Edmond's apparent equating of inferior officer status with
having a superior. Thus, the Gantt narrative views Morrison and Edmond
as "articulat[ing] two equally plausible and equally valid methods ... for
determining whether an officer rises to the level of principal status under
the Appointments Clause.,'
23
The Lewis Libby prosecution illustrates the attempt to reconcile the
two approaches to defining "inferior" officer. Libby addressed the
defense's contention that special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald did not
constitute an inferior officer, such that the vesting of his appointment
with the Acting Attorney General was constitutionally invalid.12 4 To
answer this argument, the Libby court offered a justification for the
Gantt synthesis that relied principally on Edmond's failure to repudiate
Morrison."5 Edmond did not claim explicitly to overrule Morrison;
indeed, it included Morrison in a seriatim string cite of precedents
finding officers to be inferior.226 Moreover, Edmond did not purport to
displace Morrison as the new rule governing prospectively. Instead, it
observed that the Court's Appointments Clause jurisprudence "[has] not
set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and
inferior officers for Appointments Clause purposes." '27 Libby misread
Edmond to say that there was no exclusive criterion, rather than reading
it to say that the Court had failed to articulate an exclusive criterion prior
to Edmond. Finally, even though Edmond brushed off Morrison as "not
purport[ing] to set forth a definitive test for whether an office is 'inferior'
219. 194 F.3d at 999 n.6.
220. Id. at 999.
221. Id. at 999 n.6.
222. Id.
223. United States v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2007). Libby has taken Gantt's logic a
step further. If neither Morrison nor Edmond definitively state a test for inferior officerhood, then
there "might be other factors, unarticulated in either Edmond or Morrison, that should sometimes be
given primacy when undertaking an Appointments Clause analysis, depending upon the facts of a
particular case." Id. at 16 n.23. Thus, there may be more than two valid methods for determining
officer status.
224. Id. at 5.
225. Id. at 15-20.
226. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997).
227. Id.
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under the Appointments Clause.,2. Libby concluded this statement did
not "amount to a repudiation of the Morrison calculus"2 "9 and doubted
that Edmond "even significantly abrogate[d] Morrison as binding
precedent," let alone overruled it.23
Although several courts have adopted this reconciliation, 3' its
synthesis reverses the Supreme Court's analysis. In Gantt, the Ninth
Circuit claimed "supervision by a superior officer is a sufficient but
perhaps not a necessary condition to the status of inferior officer." '32
Thus, Gantt claims it is not necessary to be a subordinate in order to be
an inferior officer.233 But Justice Scalia, who penned Edmond and
partially followed his Morrison dissent, had explained the exact opposite.
"Whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a
superior." '234 As he put it in his Morrison dissent, "it is surely a necessary
condition for inferior officer status that the officer be subordinate to
another officer.""23 Likewise, Justice Souter agreed that "[h]aving a
superior officer is necessary for inferior officer status," even though he
disagreed that subordination was sufficient to establish inferior
officerhood.3 Notwithstanding their different views in Edmond about
the sufficiency of subordination, both Justices agreed on one basic
proposition: to be inferior, an officer must necessarily be supervised.
The First Circuit, while itself adopting the Gantt approach,
acknowledged candidly this inconsistency. 37 It attempted to diminish its
significance, by deemphasizing the weight, as separate opinions, to be
228. Id.
229. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d at i6.
230. Id. at 15.
231. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 25 (ist Cir. 2000) (adopting the Gantt synthesis);
accord United States v. Baker, 504 F. Supp. 2d 402, 412 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
232. United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3 d 987, 999 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
233. Id.
234. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 65i, 662 0997).
235. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,722 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 668 ("The mere existence of a
'superior' officer is not dispositive."). Scalia's views about subordination's sufficiency changed
between his Morrison dissent and his Edmond majority opinion. In Morrison, he had said that
subordination was not sufficient to make an officer inferior. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 722. He had
subscribed to this view because the language of a failed proposal advanced by Madison would have
permitted superior officers beneath the Heads of Departments to exercise the appointments power,
thereby suggesting one could be a subordinate and still not be an inferior officer. Id. Scalia probably
inferred too much from this unadopted addition. Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting
Out of Nomination and Advice and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 830 (2006). Scalia's prior position
could be attributable in part to the fact that the Morrison litigants who framed the issue never claimed
that subordination was sufficient, only the more modest position that it was necessary. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279) (statement
of Charles Fried, Solicitor General of the United States) ("We do not say that every subordinate
person is an inferior officer .... What we say is that subordinancy is a necessary condition for a person
being an inferior officer .... ).
237. United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 25 n.4 (Ist Cir. 2000).
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accorded Scalia's Morrison dissent and Souter's Edmond concurrence.238
In doing so, it "[left] the nuances laid out in [their] separate opinions" to
the Court.239 That approach neglects the fact that Scalia's opinion on this
issue matters. He may have been Morrison's dissenter, but he became
Edmond's author. And significantly, as the First Circuit itself observed,
Edmond's approach to defining inferior officer "drafted by Justice
Scalia-bears a striking similarity to his dissent in Morrison."4 ° Thus, his
dissenting opinion in Morrison, particularly when coupled with Edmond,
ought not to be ignored. Whether inferior officer status requires
subordination is not a mere "nuance." It is the central issue in Edmond
and Morrison.
B. THE DISTINGUISHING NARRATIVE
The second narrative enthrones Edmond as the governing authority
for intrabranch appointments, but leaves Morrison authoritative over
interbranch appointments. This explanation acknowledges Edmond and
Morrison's uneasy cohabitation. It is difficult to harmonize a case that
adopts subordination as the reigning principle with another that eschews
it, at least where both cases enjoy the status of "good law." If the
otherwise mutually irreconcilable approaches govern in different
contexts, they can coexist coherently. Most intrabranch appointees will
be subordinate to the appointing superior. In such cases, Congress would
have elected not to authorize a cross-branch appointment, and therefore
would likely not have intended to insulate the appointed officer from
superior officers in the branch in which he or she would function. By
contrast, when Congress vests an officer's appointment in a different
branch, as it did in Morrison, that choice may well signal a congressional
intent to insulate the appointed officer from officers within that branch.
Because an interbranch appointee is by design unlikely to be subordinate
to either the interbranch appointing authority or superior officers in the
branch in which he/she would function, a Morrison-like standard may
preserve congressional flexibility, a virtue in the estimation of
functionalists.
This narrative finds support in Freytag v. Commissioner,24' a case
situated chronologically between Morrison and Edmond. In Freytag, the
Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court appointed a special trial judge to
preside over a tax dispute.242 The taxpayer disputed the judge's orders by
challenging his appointment's validity. 43 Freytag, however, did not use or
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 25 n.3.
241. 501 U.S. 868 (i9i).
242. Id. at 871.
243. Id. at 872.
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cite Morrison's balancing approach to determine whether the judge was
an "inferior officer." The omission is notable because the Court had
decided Morrison just three years prior by a seven to one majority.
Justice Scalia, who concurred separately, approved the implicit judgment
that inferior officers were at stake by relying on his Morrison
subordination theory.'" No other explanation offered, the Court
emphasized that "[an important fact about the appointment in this case
should not be overlooked. This case does not involve an 'interbranch'
appointment." '45 Whether the appointing Chief Judge of the Tax Court
constituted a Head of a Department or "the Courts of Law"-a
contested point-the judge's appointment would be intrabranch: either
wholly within the Executive Department, or wholly within the Judicial
Department. Thus, Freytag, like Edmond, fits the theory that intrabranch
appointments employ subordination analysis. On this account, Freytag
may represent a point on an arc retreating from Morrison by limiting its
inferior officer analysis to the context of interbranch appointments.
Notwithstanding this narrative's appeal, there is reason to doubt
Freytag so distinguished Morrison, or that it provided any basis for
explaining Edmond's and Morrison's relationship. First, context suggests
that the absence of any Morrison balancing test may have more to do
with how Freytag was litigated than any substantive choice on the Court's
part to abandon Morrison for intrabranch appointments. The Court
labors under institutional limitations imposed by the 'case-or-
controversy' requirement, including the way the parties and their amici
frame the litigated issues. If the Court approaches adjudication like a
passive umpire, it will restrict itself to their contentions. In Freytag, the
thrust of the taxpayer's argument was that special trial judges were
officers, not employees, and that the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court
constituted neither a "Head of Department" nor "the Courts of Law."24'
Freytag admitted that special trial judges were inferior officers.247 Thus,
the Court never had a very clear shot at the principal officer/inferior
officer question. The context best explains why the Court did not rely on
Morrison's balancing test or the subordination approach to conclude that
special trial judges were inferior rather than principal officers.'
244. See id. at 920 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Constitution is clear, I think, about the chain of
appointment and supervision that it envisions: Principal officers could be permitted by law to appoint
their subordinates." (emphasis added)).
245. Id. at 883 (majority opinion).
246. Id. at 888.
247. Brief for Petitioners at 27, Freytag, 501 U.S. 868 (No. 90-762). Sullivan had intimated that the
special trial judges might be principal officers, but relegated that argument to a footnote. Id. at 28 n.26.
The IRS characterized as "fanciful" petitioners' suggestion that the judges might be principal officers.
Brief for the Respondent at 33 n.26, Freytag, 5oi U.S. 868 (No. 90-762).
248. The Court did consider their powers, but its emphasis was not to assess whether they were
principal or inferior officers. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882. It was inquiring only whether the judge was an
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Second, although Freytag emphasized that the judge's appointment
was intrabranch, it did not claim to distinguish Morrison's method of
determining who is an inferior officer. Indeed, Justice Blackmun added
the opinion's sole references to Morrison only to avoid a separate
concurrence by Justice Stevens.249 In turn, Justice Stevens was answering
Justice Scalia's concurrence on a different point:2 his contention the
Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court was a "head of department," not "the
Courts of Law. 25' Stevens argued that whether one classified the Chief
Judge a "Head of Department" or "the Courts of Law" mattered little;
the judge's appointment would be intrabranch 52 As such, it did not
present any incongruity issue, an analysis undertaken in Morrison only
after it was determined that the Appointments Clause permitted the
appointment.253 The added language does not try to distinguish the
applicability of Morrison's balancing test based on appointment context;
it emphasized only that Freytag did not present any incongruity issue
both because the appointment was intrabranch and "obviously
appropriate." '54
Finally, one might expect Edmond to distinguish Morrison on the
basis of whether an appointment is intrabranch or not, if that is what
indeed it was doing. It does not. Moreover, Edmond neither cited nor
relied on Freytag for this particular proposition.55
employee or an inferior officer. The answer to that question, apparently, was not free from doubt
either. See, e.g., Conference Notes, Freytag v. Comm'r, No. 90-762 (Apr. 26, I99i), in Papers of Harry
A. Blackmun, box 579, folder I [hereinafter The Blackmun Papers] (on file with the Library of
Congress) (reporting, under Justice Souter's name, "We assume [a special trial judge] is an inferior
officer. Is he?"); Transcript of Oral Argument at i8, Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (I99I) (No. 90-
762) (statement of O'Connor, J.) ("Well, have we really gone into any depth in defining who is an
inferior officer and who is an employee?").
249. Justice Stevens's supplemental language in the final opinion provided that:
An important fact about the appointment in this case should not be overlooked. This case
does not involve an 'interbranch' appointment. However one might classify the chief judge
of the Tax Court, there surely is nothing incongruous about giving him the authority to
appoint the clerk or an assistant judge for that court. We do not consider here an
appointment by some officer of inferior officers in, for example, the Department of
Commerce or Department of State. The appointment in this case is so obviously
appropriate that petitioners' burden of persuading us that it violates the Appointments
Clause is indeed a heavy one.
Although petitioners bear a heavy burden, their challenge is a serious one.
Memo from Ann Alpers to Harry Blackmun Re: Freytag v. Comm'r, No. 90-762, (June 19, 1991), in
The Blackmun Papers, supra note 248, box 578, folder 7. A law clerk to Justice Blackmun claimed she
persuaded Justice Stevens's clerk to agree to the inclusion of the language in the majority opinion
thereby mollifying Justice Stevens and avoiding a separate concurrence. Id.
250. Id.
251. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 901-02 (Scalia, J., concurring).
252. Memo from Ann Alpers to Harry Blackmun Re: Freytag v. Comm'r, No. 90-762 (June 19,
I99I), in The Blackmun Papers, supra note 248, box 578, folder 7.
253. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654. 676 (1988).
254. Id.
255. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 , 6591662, 665 0997).
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C. THE OVERRULING NARRATIVE
The final narrative concludes that Morrison and Edmond are
incompatible. It would acknowledge Edmond as having overruled
Morrison sub silentio, at least with respect to the question of "inferior
officers." According to this account, Edmond represents a quiet
counterrevolution in the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence.56
This explanation finds support both in Morrison archival sources as
well as Scalia's view of precedent. First, evidence external to the
opinions-from Justice Blackmun's conference notes-suggests Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, the Morrison majority's author, switched his
view of subordination in Edmond. In Morrison, Rehnquist rejected
subordination as the sine qua non of inferior officerhood 57 This
rejection of subordination by Rehnquist was explicit in the case
conference.25s In light of his prior view, it is telling that Rehnquist
assigned Scalia the task of writing the majority's opinion revisiting the
same issue in Edmond.59 Rehnquist knew well Scalia's opposing views on
the issue of inferior officers. Nonetheless, he exercised his prerogative as
Chief Justice to invite Scalia to author the majority opinion on the very
subject on which they had disagreed nine years earlier. It is difficult to
harmonize the opinions as reconcilable given Rehnquist and Scalia's
prior disagreement. Edmond appears to represent Rehnquist's
acquiescence to Scalia's view of the law in this area.
Second, such a sub silentio approach to overruling by Justice Scalia is
consistent with his judicial behavior elsewhere, and his general approach
to precedent. For example, Printz v. United States," ' decided within a
month of Edmond and also authored by Scalia, adopted a theory of the
unitary executive that Morrison had rejected. 6 ' Again, Printz did not
256. On this account, Scalia declared the subordination principle by using the "[g]enerally
speaking" language, id. at 662, to acknowledge silently Morrison. He thereby allowed a dispensation
for Morrison as a constitutional trespass while clarifying that it was not the rule.
257. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) ("Although appellant may not be 'subordinate'
to the Attorney General ... the fact that she can be removed by the Attorney General indicates that
she is to some degree 'inferior' in rank and authority." (emphasis added)).
258. Harry Blackmun's notes reflect Rehnquist and O'Connor on record rejecting outright the
Solicitor General's subordination argument. Conference Notes, Morrison v. Olson, No. 87-1279 (Apr.
29, 1988), in The Blackmun Papers, supra note 248, box 507, folder 8 (reporting, under Chief Justice
Rehnquist's name, "no buy SG's subordination argmt" and, under Justice O'Connor's name, "rejected
SG's subordinate proposition"); see also Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the
Separation of Powers, and the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1757-58 (2OO6). Although
the use of judicial history "may [eventually] make such sources unreliable," Adrian Vermeule, Judicial
History, io8 YALE L.J. 1311, 1343 (1999), nothing suggests that the Justices' conference comments-
which are consistent with Morrison's majority opinion-were less than candid or authentic.
259. The case was not a five to four decision where Scalia's vote might have been necessary to
maintain a majority.
26o. See Bybee & Samahon, supra note 258, at 1758 & nn.143-44.
261. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
262. Again, Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned his former Morrison opponent the task of writing the
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purport to overrule Morrison. Edmond may simply be a sub silentio
assault on one of Morrison's other fronts.
This brushing off of precedent represents more than mere mischief.
Scalia is a civilian at heart, who subscribes only half-heartedly to the
application of common-law stare decisis to the interpretation of
constitutional text. In A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia observed
approvingly that no requirement of stare decisis exists "in the civil-law
system, where it is the text of the law rather than any prior judicial
interpretation of that text which is authoritative. Prior judicial opinions
are consulted for their persuasive effect, much as academic commentary
would be; but they are not binding. '63 For Scalia, constitutional and
statutory text enjoy priority over inconsistent judicial interpretations of
them, 64 particularly those precedents-such as Morrison's free-form
interpretation of "inferior officer"-that fail to account for the text's
plain meaning, structural context, purpose, and history. This approach
would fit a classic Scalia pattern of "rationaliz[ing] the existing messy
pattern of cases by grandfathering in a few exceptions.
' ', 65
But did Edmond really overrule rather than merely clarify
Morrison? After all, it acknowledges the Morrison factors and explains
that the decision did not purport to articulate a "definitive test"-not
obviously a pronouncement that Morrison is dead. 66 Moreover, given the
unavailability of any Justices' papers in Edmond, no postmortem is
possible by resort to judicial history.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of incompatibility is that the
subordination rule, if it were applied in Morrison, would reverse its
outcome 6 Morrison concluded that the independent counsel constituted
an inferior officer, such that her appointment by the D.C. Circuit's
Special Division was valid. 68 Significantly, the Court said she was not
majority's opinion, including the section purporting to adopt a theory of the unitary executive. See
generally Jay S. Bybee, Essay, Printz, the Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has Justice
Scalia Picked the Court's Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269 (2001) (inquiring whether Scalia's
Printz majority opinion undoes Morrison).
263. ANTONIN SCALIA. Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 7 (997); see also Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original
Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259 (2oo5) (articulating the case for
priority of constitutional text over inconsistent interpretive precedent).
264. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I agree with
Justice Douglas: 'A judge ... remembers above all else that it is the Constitution which he swore to
support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it."' (quoting William O.
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 736 (1949))).
265. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, Io6 HARV. L. REV. 22,
87 (1992).
266. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 65I, 661 (1997).
267. Bravin, supra note 218, at 1137.
268. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988).
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subordinate to any superior,"6 but concluded nonetheless that she was an
inferior officer by weighing the attributes of office. 7 The subordinate
interpretation, however, would have resulted in her appointment being
declared unconstitutional. This incons;stency of outcome suggests that
Edmond is no mere clarification of Morrison but a wholesale rewrite.
A possible objection to declaring Morrison "overruled" sub silentio
is that lower courts may have relied on the case. Very few lower courts,
however, have relied on Morrison's approach to determining who is an
inferior officer.27" ' This makes it less consequential to declare Morrison
overruled. 7 Moreover, those cases involving intrabranch appointments
would have been resolved the same way under the Edmond
subordination rule. 73 Finally, although overruling a case creates some
unpredictability due to surprise in the short term, to the extent that the
new interpretation is susceptible to less varied application, the net result
will be more predictability for the legislature and litigants, not less.
D. THE VALUES EMBEDDED IN THE NARRATIVES
Laying aside the narratives of what Edmond may have intended or
how the Court would handle the inferior officer issue in the future, which
of the narrative approaches ought the Court to take? The doctrinal
approaches embodied by each of the narratives reflect competing policy
values. For example, some litigants and commentators have
characterized the choice between Morrison and Edmond as a choice
between a standard and a rule. 74 Such characterization suggests an
appeal to the longstanding debate between the purported merits and
demerits of standards versus rules. 75 Generally, standards reflect a
substantive value choice that casts fairness in terms of substantive justice
(i.e., courts should treat similar cases alike).7' Standards are adaptable to
changing circumstances because of the discretion involved.77 Similarly,
269. Id. at 671.
270. Id. at 671-72.
271. See, e.g., Varnadore v. Sec'y of Labor, 141 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1998); Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 80 F.3d 796 (3rd Cir. 1996); Silver v. U.S. Postal Serv., 951
F.2d 1033 (9 th Cir. I99).
272. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,854 (1992) (noting that little reliance on
the past precedent to be overruled is an exception to the traditional barrier to overruling).
273. See, e.g., Silver, 951 F.2d at 1038 (concluding the Postmaster General was an inferior officer
because he was merely an agent of the Board of Governors).
274. In Libby, the defendant characterized Edmond's approach to the inferior officer question as
supplanting Morrison's balancing approach in favor of a "straightforward rule." United States v.
Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1, I5 (D.D.C. 2007).
275. For some skepticism about the rule-standard dichotomy, see Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards. 33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
276. Sullivan, supra note 265, at 66.
277. Id.
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standards force judicial accountability and deliberation because judges
have discretion.278
Rules reflect a different set of substantive values. They reduce
official arbitrariness, increase predictability, and curtail jurocracy by
securing the legislature's role as chief policymaker 79 As Justice Scalia
has put it, "[o]nly by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.''° On
this account, Congress might find a rule-based approach to the inferior
officer question particularly valuable in the context of structural
constitutional law, where predictability is of paramount importance.
Framing institutions requires a stable, predictable constitutional
foundation. Consider that, under Morrison's approach, the addition of
new duties, jurisdiction, etc., to an officer invites rebalancing. Balancing,
as a dynamic undertaking, permits challenges over every incremental
grant of authority. At each amendment, it may be asked whether the
addition of authority had converted an inferior officer into a principal
one. In contrast, amendments adopted against the backdrop of a rule
may prove less susceptible to perpetual reexamination.
The choice between Morrison and Edmond is not merely a
methodological dispute about the preferable form of the inferior officer
test. After all, the Court could adopt the subordination interpretation
(per Edmond), 8' yet implement that principle doctrinally using a multi-
factored balancing test, rather than a rule. Alternatively, the Court could
subscribe to Morrison's definition that an "inferior officer" is a lesser or
less significant officer,"" yet implement that approach by use of a formal
rule. Thus, beyond the substantive values embodied in the methods
(standards or rules), the two cases additionally represent substantive
views about the content of the separation of powers.
The overruling narrative has an important policy consequence. It
precludes interbranch appointments pursuant to the Excepting Clause.
Subordination prevents such appointments because, for example, an
officer exercising judicial power cannot be subordinate to an appointing
officer from the executive branch. A judicial officer subject to an
executive officer's supervision would violate the separation of powers.
Subordination requires that appointments pursuant to the Excepting
Clause follow the Constitution's departmentalization of power. Such an
outcome is desirable because intrabranch appointments reinforce
departmental political accountability.
278. Id. at 67.
279. Id. at 62-65; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CI. L. REV. I175,
1178-79 (1989).
280. Scalia, supra note 279, at i i8o.
281. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997).
282. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988).
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Further, disallowing interbranch appointments diminishes the
emphasis placed on the distinction between inferior and noninferior
officers. Under Morrison, the linchpin of the Excepting Clause analysis is
whether an officer is principal or inferior. s3 This reliance on the
inferior/principal officer distinction may "cause the question of who is an
inferior officer and who is a principal officer to bear far too much
weight. '2S4 As then-Solicitor General Charles Fried argued in Morrison:
It is only when you have cross branch appointments that it becomes
crucially important to decide whether a particular person is important
enough, subordinate enough to be subject to the inferior officer clause
or the principal officer clause.
We submit that these are problems which the framers did not intend
us to face and that we need not face, because the appropriate thing to
do is simply to recognize and to maintain the integrity of each of the
branches, and not countenance a system which would allow the
Executive Branch to be shattered into a thousand small offices, each of
whom would be appointed by courts of law. 5'
If interbranch appointments are impermissible, it remains important only
that the officer is subordinate.
This approach avoids the risk that the threshold between inferior
and principal officer has been crossed with each change in the office. To
be sure, deemphasizing the inferior/principal distinction shifts the weight
of the inquiry toward whether an officer is "subordinate," which a court
may construe as a malleable standard rather than a bright-line rule. But
even that uncertainty could be cabined if the Court gave the subordinate
interpretation a construction that resorted to bright-line rules rather than
standards? 86
IV. Two CHALLENGES TO OPTING OUT BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
Congress may entrust the circuit courts with the power to appoint
inferior officers pursuant to the Excepting Clause. "The Courts of Law"
encompass the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and the rest of the
Article III judiciary. Whether or not bankruptcy judges constitute
principal or inferior officers is the key interpretive issue in a challenge to
their appointments' validity. This issue turns on whether the subordinate
or lesser interpretation of "inferior" officer governs.
In Part III, this Article offered three competing narratives that
explain the relationship between Morrison and Edmond and their
competing interpretations of "inferior officer." Under the "reconciling"
283. Id.
284. Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 87-1279)
(statement of Charles Fried, Solicitor General of the United States).
285. Id. at 62.
286. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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narrative, Morrison may yet have vitality. This fact carries great
significance for bankruptcy judges. Its interpretation of "inferior officer"
raises serious doubts about the permissibility of the present method of
appointing bankruptcy judges. This challenge is outlined in section B,
below.
If either the "distinguishing" or "overruling" narratives govern, a
Morrison-type challenge would be unavailable. However, even were the
court to settle upon the "subordinate" interpretation of "inferior
officer," it does not follow apodictically that bankruptcy judges are
"inferior officers" permissibly opted out of advice and consent. There
remains the further question of the judicial construction of
"subordinate," i.e., the necessary doctrinal implementation required to
apply the subordinate interpretation to the case of bankruptcy judges.
An Edmond-type challenge, based on competing constructions, might
still be available. It is outlined in section C, below.
A. THE ORIGIN OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CHALLENGE
The Legislature, the Executive, and the Courts have said little about
whether bankruptcy judges constitute inferior officers. What has been
said provides surprisingly mixed support for the proposition that
bankruptcy judges are inferior officers.
i. The Legislature- Creating the Problem
When Congress vested the appointment of bankruptcy judges in the
U.S. courts of appeals, it expressed its view that the judges are inferior
officers. Similarly, it implicitly acknowledged bankruptcy referees under
the 1898 Act as inferior officers when it vested their appointments in the
U.S. district courts.5 8
Despite this, the status of BAFJA bankruptcy judges as "inferior
officers" has a checkered legislative pedigree. In hearings leading up to
the 1978 Act, Congress had considered vesting the appointments of the
bankruptcy judges in the courts, as BAFJA does today.28 Chairman
Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee had invited
distinguished law professors and practitioners to comment on the
proposed selection method."" All the experts agreed that the judges
were, at a minimum, officers of the United States, and thus subject to the
Appointments Clause."9 Several of the experts, however, doubted that
287. See Birch v. Steele, 165 F. 577, 587 (5th Cir. 19o8) (characterizing referees as officers whose
appointments were vested in "the courts of bankruptcy").
288. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 63 (1977), reprinted in i978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6023.
289. Rodino, supra note 79, at 2682-84.
290. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., to
Peter Rodino, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights 72
(June 30, 1976), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 79, at 269o ("I have no doubt that such judges would
be 'officers of the U.S.' within the meaning given that phrase in Buckley .... ").
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the bankruptcy judges would be inferior officers, subject to the Excepting
Clause. They expressed serious reservations about the constitutionality
of bypassing advice and consent.
Professor David Shapiro elaborated his view that "anything short of
Presidential appointment, with the consent of the Senate, would raise the
most serious constitutional questions.''. He noted that the bankruptcy
judges would enjoy "powers considerably broader than those of
bankruptcy referees under present law, and although subject to judicial
review, it would, I think be essentially an independent body.
9'
Moreover, the judges would exercise "broad-ranging functions... [and]
would hold the highest positions in the new court."'93 Although
acknowledging he could point to no controlling authority, he thought
principal officer status was "supported by the scope of the judges'
functions and the responsibility they will exercise."' 94  Two other
witnesses concurred with his conclusion.95 Only one witness thought the
proposed appointments regime constitutionally defensible.'9
Perhaps as a result of the testimony, the 1978 Act followed the
default rule of presidential nomination with appointment after Senate
confirmation. 97 Of course, what weight this expert testimony ought to
bear on BAFJA judges is disputable. BAFJA judges do wield less power
than the 1978 Act judges.' But, absent any settled rule about the
boundary between principal and inferior officer, it is unclear whether the
BAFJA judges would present the same concerns as the 1978 Act judges.
But, as one of the House conferees on BAFJA put it, the present
selection method is "not free from constitutional doubt."'
99
291. Letter from David L. Shapiro, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Peter Rodino, Chairman,
House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights 84 (May 17, 1976), reprinted in
Hearings, supra note 79, at 2703.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2704.
295. See Letter from Erwin N. Griswold, Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, to Peter Rodino,
Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights 69 (May 24, 1976),
reprinted in Hearings, supra note 79, at 2688; Letter from Paul J. Mishkin, Professor, Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley, to Peter Rodino, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights 78 (June 22, 1976), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 79, at 2697.
296. See Letter from Brice M. Clagett, Partner, Covington & Burling, to Peter Rodino, Chairman,
House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights 65-66 (June 3, 1976), reprinted
in Hearings, supra note 79, at 2684 ("Under [the Excepting Clause], all judges of inferior courts-that
is, of all courts other than the Supreme Court-could be selected, pursuant to Act of Congress, by
means other than presidential appointment and Senate confirmation ....").
297. Another possible explanation is that Democrats controlled the Congress and the presidency
and in view of such they may have been unwilling to vest the judges' appointments in the politically
insulated Courts of Law when they controlled the 'political ball.'
298. See discussion supra Parts I.B.2-3.
299. 130 Cong. Rec. 20,225 (1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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2. The Executive -Missing the Problem
The executive branch was largely inattentive to whether bankruptcy
judges constituted inferior officers. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),
which reviews the constitutionality of proposed legislation, gave only
cursory consideration to BAFJA's implicit classification of "bankruptcy
judges" as "inferior officers." Then-Assistant Attorney General
Theodore Olson asserted that "[t]here can be no doubt that in the 1984
Act Congress could have placed the appointment power in the President,
with or without the advice and consent of the Senate, the Heads of
Departments, or the Courts pursuant to the Appointments Clause.
3
0
This assessment adopted implicitly the predicate that bankruptcy judges
are "inferior officers." It, however, offered no reasons for its conclusion.
Similarly, in a bill review memorandum, OLC concluded, again without
discussion, that proceedings directed by bankruptcy judges appointed by
the courts of appeals were "unquestionably valid." ''
3. The Courts-Dodging the Problem
Neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has resolved
squarely whether a bankruptcy judge constitutes an "inferior officer" for
purposes of the Excepting Clause. Only two reported cases have
broached that issue, and only in passing.32 The adversarial proceeding
Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. questioned whether bankruptcy judges
constitute inferior officers. 3  The defendants challenged the court's
jurisdiction and authority, including the "allegedly defective appointment
process for Bankruptcy Judges."3 4 The bankruptcy judge remarked in
passing that he questioned whether he would constitute an "inferior
officer" rather than a principal one under Morrison's balancing test.3" He
did not address the issue at any length, but "observe[d] that by applying
this test to determine whether sitting Bankruptcy Judges are inferior
officers, we stretch the definition of inferior officer to its broadest
boundaries." ' Opining that the ability to conduct a jury trial would tip
the Morrison balance away from "inferior officer" and toward "principal
officer," the judge perceived a "Catch 22." 3" If he were to claim authority
300. 7 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 183, 198 (1983) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
301. Memorandum from Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Carol Dinkins, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice 4 (July 6, 1984)
(on file with The Hastings Law Journal). To be sure, the Office of Legal Counsel had focused on a
different objectionable aspect of the bill. See supra note io6 and accompanying text.
302. A third case characterized (in passing) bankruptcy judges as "inferior officers" of the district
courts. Boyer v. Johnson (In re Golden Gulf, Ltd.), 73 B.R. 685,694 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987).
303. Wilkey v. Inter-Trade, Inc. (In re Owensboro Distilling Co.), iO8 BR. 572, 577 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1989).
304. Id. at 574.




to conduct a jury trial, then he would constitute a principal officer."" But
if he were a principal officer, then his appointment would violate the
Appointments Clause.3" His appointment thus voided, he would then
lack authority to conduct a jury trial.3'0 Rather than answer the dilemma,
the judge resolved the issue by transferring the case to the district court
and concluding he lacked any authority to conduct a jury trial.3 ' He
thereby dodged squarely answering whether he was an inferior officer,
but suggested that he might not be one if he had the power to conduct
jury trials. Interestingly, Congress amended the code to authorize
explicitly bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials in 1994.312 Bankruptcy
judges today would constitute principal officers under Wilkey's dictum.
On the other hand, In re Benny, an Appointments Clause challenge
to the statutory retroactive extension of transition period judges, opined
in its dictum that bankruptcy judges were inferior officers.313 Judge
Norris's concurrence found that "providing for appointment of new
judges by the Courts of Appeals ... [was] unobjectionable '3 14 and that
"[t]here was nothing to prevent the Courts of Appeals, vested with the
appointment power under the 1984 Act, from reappointing the slate of
incumbent judges."" 5  Although the concurrence's dictum was
unequivocal, the issue was never briefed by the parties, and unnecessary
to the case's outcome. The only appointments issue raised was whether
the retroactive extensions constituted reappointments in violation of the
Appointments Clause.
To be sure, a circuit court in 19o8 had implicitly categorized early
bankruptcy referees as "inferior officers."' 6 It observed that "[t]he
Constitution confers the power on Congress to vest in the courts the
authority to appoint referees," citing the Appointments Clause and the




311. Id. at 578. It is unlikely such a dodge would long avert an appointments challenge. This issue
would recur whenever bankruptcy judges attempted to enter orders. There would be ample occasions
for parties to raise the nettlesome issue until it was definitely resolved. Moreover, a party could
sidestep withdrawal of the reference by simply sandbagging and raising the challenge for the first time
on appeal. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 878-79 (1995) (permitting an Appointments Clause
challenge to be raised for the first time on appeal); accord Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962)
(plurality). But see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 953 (I99i) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that failure to raise an Appointments Clause challenge below waived any later appeal of the issue);
accord Freytag, 501 U.S. at 892-901 (Scalia, J., concurring).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (2006).
313. Benny v. England (In re Benny), 812 F.2d 1133, 1149 n.i6 (9th Cir. 1987) (Norris, J.,
concurring) (entertaining challenge to sections io6 and 121 of BAFJA).
314. Id. at 1142.
315. Id. at 1145.
316. See Birch v. Steele, 165 F. 577, 586 (5th Cir. 19o8).
317. Id.
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Bankruptcy judges, however, differ in kind from referees as they existed
at the turn of the century. Referees, who served for two-year terms at the
pleasure of the district court, handled principally administrative matters,
not adjudicative tasks, and lacked most of the jurisdiction and duties
exercised by the modern bankruptcy bench."'8 Birch, then, provides only
weak authority for the idea that today's bankruptcy judges are inferior
officers.
B. THE CHALLENGE UNDER MORRISON
Morrison attempted to determine who is an "inferior officer" by
considering four factors, expressed in terms specifically applicable to the
executive office of independent counsel. These factors include whether
the officer's tenure was limited, whether the officer was subject to
removal by a higher officer, whether the officers exercised only limited
jurisdiction, and whether the duties they exercised were limited.319
Morrison elaborated these factors in terms particularly relevant to
inferior executive officers. To use this test outside that context, it is
necessary to transpose these factors into the context of bankruptcy
judges. Below, the Article considers and balances the four factors and
concludes that the bankruptcy judges are likely principal officers under
Morrison's test.
i. Balancing Tenure, Safeguard Against Removal, Duties, and
Jurisdiction
a. Tenure
Morrison requires a court to consider whether the officer's tenure
was "limited,.32 i.e., whether the appointment was essentially to
accomplish a single task at the end of which the office is terminated.321
The American Bar Association in Morrison had argued that the
independent counsel was an "inferior" officer because she "may only
investigate and prosecute a single, defined matter delineated by the
court.... Upon conclusion of the defined investigation, the office is
terminated. 32. The Special Division of the D.C. Circuit tasked the
independent counsel in Morrison with investigating Assistant Attorney
General Theodore Olson and two other Reagan administration officials
for allegedly making false statements to Congress under oath.323 When
the investigation concluded, the counsel's office terminated. Thus, the
tenure was "limited."
318. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, §§ 34, 38-39, 30 Stat. 544, 555-56 (repealed 1978).
319. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988).
320. Id. at 672.
321. Id.; see also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 66I (i997).
322. Brief of Am. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at ii, Morrison, 487 U.S.
654 (No. 87-1279).
323. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 665-67.
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Bankruptcy judges are not "limited" in tenure within the meaning of
Morrison. Their office extends beyond the completion of a single case or
task. Only the earliest predecessors to bankruptcy judges held such case-
specific tenures.324 Since that time, Congress has provided registers,
referees, and modern bankruptcy judges with fixed tenures that have
grown over time. Bankruptcy judges now hold their offices for fourteen
years,3"5 a term which one judge characterized as approximating the
average actual tenure served by Article III judges.32 Many principal
officers serve far fewer years than bankruptcy judges.3"7
b. Safeguard Against Removal
Whether an officer is subject to easy removal by a higher officer
favors the status of inferior rather than principal officer."'s The
Independent Counsel Act limited the grounds for dismissing an
independent counsel:
[The] independent counsel... may be removed from office ... only by
the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause,
physical or mental disability... or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's
duties.329
Although this enumeration of grounds for removal restricted the
President's traditional ability to remove senior executive officers at
will,33 it nonetheless preserved a means of removal for "good cause."33'
In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court had interpreted limited grounds for
removal, such as "neglect of duty" and "malfeasance" in office, as
324. See discussion supra note 27.
325. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(I) (2oo6).
326. Mund, Part Three, supra note 82, at 364 n.8o. But see Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and
Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 616 (2005)
(determining average duration of service to be twenty to twenty-five years for lower federal court
judges in the modern era).
327. Some bankruptcy judges had even argued colorably-but unsuccessfully-they were entitled
to reappointment to another fourteen-year term absent a showing of failure to perform their office.
See, e.g., Scholl v. United States, 6I Fed. Cl. 322, 326 (2004) (denying the government's renewed
motion to dismiss), rev'd sub nom. In re United States, 463 F.3d 1328, 1336 (3d Cir. 2006); Bason v.
Judicial Council of the D.C. Circuit, 86 B.R. 744, 750 (D.D.C. 1988). Regardless of any right to be
reappointed, over 9o% of bankruptcy judges who sought reappointment were successful. See LoPucKi,
supra note 135, at 21.
328. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
329. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)().
330. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926).
331. Scalia doubted that the removal factor favored the conclusion that the independent counsel
was an inferior officer. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[M]ost (if not all) principal
officers in the Executive Branch may be removed by the President at will. I fail to see how the fact that
appellant is more difficult to remove than most principal officers helps to establish that she is an
inferior officer." (emphasis omitted)).
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potentially "very broad" grants of discretion that "could sustain
removal... for any number of actual or perceived transgressions." '332
Bankruptcy judges enjoy greater protection against removal than the
already heavily safeguarded independent counsel. Although the judges
may be removed from office only for limited statutory grounds,333 they
are further entitled to "a full specification of charges" against them and
an opportunity to rebut them.334 Thus, unlike Bowsher, the procedural
safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard cabin what might
otherwise be a purely discretionary determination. Moreover,
bankruptcy judges are not removable upon the "personal action" of a
single officer. The removal of an independent counsel required only the
Attorney General's say-so. A bankruptcy judge, by contrast, is ousted
only upon a majority vote of the circuit's judicial council, which is likely
to be almost the exact same group of officers who originally appointed
the officer.335 Of course, a bankruptcy judge may be impeached and
removed from office, as may all officers of the United States-whether
principal or inferior. 336 But her security in office does not suggest a
bankruptcy judge is of "lesser" power or duties.
c. Duties
A court hearing an Appointments Clause challenge would consider
whether the officer "perform[ed] only certain, limited duties." '337 In
Morrison, the independent counsel could investigate and prosecute
certain enumerated federal crimes."38 In the adjudicative context,
"duties"-i.e., powers and tasks in furtherance of the officer's
jurisdiction-could include the review of sentences, the verification that
factual and legal findings are correct (including weighty constitutional
issues), and the weighing and admitting of evidence.339
Bankruptcy judges exercise several significant duties that could
constitute them as principal officers. They exercise broad equitable
powers.34 They may enjoin other courts."' If the district court designates
332. 478 U.S. 714,729 (i986).
333. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) ("A bankruptcy judge may be removed during the term for which such
bankruptcy judge is appointed, only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or
mental disability .....
334- Id.
335. Id. For a rare example of a forced resignation, see Bankruptcy Judge Dismissed for Tax
Fraud, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 29, 2001, at A26.
336. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4. No bankruptcy judge to date has been impeached.
337. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,671 (1988).
338. 28 U.S.C. § 591.
339. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997).
340. it U.S.C. § io5(a) (2006); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S. Ct. 1105, M116-17
(2007); see supra note i i i and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 8oi F.2d
60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (allowing a bankruptcy judge to enjoin a state court action that interfered with
estate administration).
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and the parties consent, they may conduct a jury trial.34 ' Although the
Bankruptcy Code does not make it "clear whether and what contempt
power exists, ' '3 43 that has not prevented bankruptcy judges from
exercising it-both in its civil3" and its criminal dimensions.3 45 There is
even some question whether bankruptcy judges, in discharging these
duties, must follow district court precedent in their decisionmaking. 6
d. Jurisdiction
A court must consider whether an officer is "limited in
jurisdiction." '347 If so, it favors the conclusion that the officer is inferior.348
Morrison concluded that jurisdiction was limited where the Independent
Counsel Act itself restricted the exercise of jurisdiction to a set of federal
officials "suspected of certain serious federal crimes. '3 49 Moreover, the
Act further provided the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit with
authority to "define that independent counsel's prosecutorial
jurisdiction.""35 An assessment of limited jurisdiction had two dimensions.
First, the independent counsel exercised investigative and prosecutorial
jurisdiction over a limited number of individuals or parties. Second, she
exercised jurisdiction over a limited number of subjects.
This limited jurisdiction inquiry may be transposed from the context
of an executive investigative and prosecutorial officer to the context of
judicial officers. Courts exercise both subject-matter jurisdiction, or
power over certain subjects in dispute, and personal jurisdiction, or
power over parties.
Bankruptcy judges may hear and decide a broad array of disputes.
Indeed, notwithstanding a state's sovereign immunity, bankruptcy judges
may entertain claims brought against state entities, 5 ' a power that most
district courts may not exercise, except when they sit as a court in
bankruptcy. In addition to deciding questions that are decidedly about
"bankruptcy," they may also hear disputes that cross many legal
342. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e).
343. I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.o9(2)(a), 3-I1 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. rev.
2008).
344. See, e.g., Placid Refining Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel &
Lube, Inc.), io8 F.3d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1997) (relying on iI U.S.C. § I05(a) for its civil contempt
power).
345. See, e.g., Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1178 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding
criminal contempt order that permitted the attorney to file objections and seek the district court's de
novo review). But see Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1197 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concluding no inherent power to levy punitive sanctions).
346. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817, 870-71 (1994).
347. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. 28 U.S.C. § 5 93(b) (2oo6).
351. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,359 (2006).
(Vol. 6o:233
December 2008] BANKRUPTCY JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
specialties including "taxes, torts, negotiable instruments, contracts,
spendthrift and other trusts, mortgages, conveyances, landlord and
tenant relationships, partnerships, mining, oil and gas extraction,
domestic relations, labor relations, insurance, Securities and Exchange
Commission statutes, regulations and decisional law." '352 Although the
post-Marathon regime restricted what and how a bankruptcy court could
handle different disputes, "BAFJA does not represent a significant
congressional retreat from the jurisdictional provisions of the 1978
Code.
,353
The power and independence of bankruptcy judges to resolve these
disputes depend on whether they may be characterized as "core" or
"non-core" proceedings. Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter self-
executing, final orders in all core proceedings, subject only to appellate
review by the district court. 54 Core proceedings include not only matters
of administration of a debtor's estate (although it certainly includes that),
but also avoidance actions, and the property of the estate. 355 These
categories encompass many potential disputes. Core proceedings
constitute most of the work of bankruptcy judges; less than 5% of
bankruptcy proceedings are non-core.357
Bankruptcy judges also exercise power to entertain non-core
proceedings that are supported by federal court "related to"
jurisdiction.) In deciding these matters, bankruptcy judges act more like
magistrate judges. They may hear non-core matters (i.e., anything
relating to the debtor's estate).359 In such cases, the bankruptcy judge
prepares proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and submits
them to the district court. 36' The district court has power to review them
de novo and enter final orders.,6' What constitutes a non-core proceeding
"related to" a bankruptcy case is potentially very broad. If its
outcome could conceivably have an effect on the bankruptcy estate
and... (i) involve causes of action owned by the debtor that became
property of a title ii estate under section 541 ... or (2) are suits
between third parties that in the absence of bankruptcy, could have
been brought in a district court or a state court.3
62
352. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 1o (1977), reprinted in t978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5971.
353. Warner, supra note 126, at 997.
354. 28 U.S.C. § 15 7(b)(I).
355. Id. § I57(b)(2).
356. Id.
357. Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 199O BYU L. REv. 545, 561
n.73 (199o). Section 157 (b)(2) provides an illustrative, but not exclusive, list of what constitutes a "core
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
358. Id. § 157(c).
359. Id. § 157(c)(I).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. I COLLIER ON BANKRUTCY, supra note 343, 3.OI(4)(c)(ii), 3-24 (footnotes omitted) (internal
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Bankruptcy judges determine their own jurisdiction as well as the
treatment of proceedings as core or non-core 63 Their conclusions are
dispositive orders, which may be appealed on an interlocutory basis. 64
Such an arrangement gives bankruptcy judges far more power than the
independent counsel in Morrison. In Morrison, it was the Court of
Appeals that determined the independent counsel's jurisdiction. Here, it
is the officers themselves.
It might be argued that a bankruptcy judge's exercise of jurisdiction
in both core and non-core proceedings is limited by a district judge's
ability to "withdraw the reference" of the exercise of federal court
jurisdiction to a bankruptcy judge.6 5 Under the 1978 Act, Congress tried
to get around the issue of non-Article III judges deciding cases by using
"flow-through" jurisdiction.66 The statute gave the district court all of the
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and then a second statute provided that the
bankruptcy courts "shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this
section on the district courts. ' ' 36 7 Thus, Congress vested in the district
court all jurisdictional power, and then by statute mandated it delegated
to the bankruptcy court. In Marathon, the Supreme Court struck down
the provision as unconstitutional. 368 Post-Marathon, Congress vested
jurisdiction in the district court., 69 But then, Congress, rather than
mandating its delegation to bankruptcy judges, merely permitted the
district courts to refer cases to the bankruptcy court: "[e]ach district
court may provide that any or all cases under title ii and any or all
proceedings arising under title i i or arising in or related to a case under
title i i shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
3 7
Unfortunately, the power to withdraw the reference does not serve
the function its authors intended of making bankruptcy judges less
important or even subordinate to an Article III court. First, it is
uncommon for a district court to withdraw the reference in bankruptcy
cases.37" ' Bankruptcy judges are "functionally final" in their adjudicatory
work.372 They "may have as much real judicial independence as Article
III judges." '373 Although on its face the statute may seem like a
quotation marks omitted).
363. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
364. Id. § 158(a).
365. Id. § 15 7(d).
366. Id. § 1471(a), (c) (1976).
367. Id. § 1471(c).
368. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
369. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
370. Id. § 157(a) (emphasis added).
371. LoPUCKI, supra note 135, at 85.
372. Resnik, supra note 326. at 61o.
373. Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 622 (1998).
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permissible arrangement, in its application there is no control due to the
volume and press of business. The reality is that district courts almost
never withdraw the reference. Second, even when a district court would
like to withdraw the reference, that power is not discretionary, but is
limited to withdrawal of the reference for cause only.374
Bankruptcy judges are not limited in their jurisdiction over parties.
They are authorized to exercise power over any party located within the
United States or who may have minimum contacts with the United
States.3 ' This authority is broader than the jurisdiction district judges
ordinarily exercise in civil matters, except when they hear bankruptcy
cases."76 Moreover, bankruptcy venue rules are less restrictive than those
generally applicable in civil cases, again granting bankruptcy judges
broad authority to exercise power over parties.377
2. Potential Objections and Responses
A Morrison-type challenge would face several objections. Below are
some probable objections and responses.
a. "Bankruptcy Judges Are Like Magistrate Judges"
A court deciding whether bankruptcy judges constitute inferior
officers would analogize them to other judicial officers, such as
magistrate judges, who are also appointed by "the Courts of Law." A
court might conclude that because magistrate judges are said to be
inferior officers, bankruptcy judges are as well. This comparison does not
withstand closer inspection.
First, the comparison between bankruptcy and magistrate judges has
its limitations. Although magistrate judges, like bankruptcy judges, may
not be removed from office except for good cause, they serve only four
or eight-year terms."78 Jurisdictionally, and in terms of their duties,
magistrate judges are subject to more formal and actual oversight than
bankruptcy judges. For example, unlike magistrate judges, bankruptcy
judges may issue self-executing orders without the parties' consent in
"core proceedings," subject to being halted only if reversed on appeal.379
To be sure, bankruptcy judges have a magistrate judge-like authority.
They may try non-core civil proceedings and issue proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which require a district judge's formal
374. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
375. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
376. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
377. 28 U.S.C. §§ i4o8-1410.
378. Id. § 63 1(e).
379. Id. § 157(b).
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approval to become final orders.'8 But such non-core proceedings
constitute a numerically small portion of a bankruptcy judge's work.3 '
Second, although it is received wisdom that magistrate judges and
magistrates before them are "inferior officers," upon closer scrutiny, the
status of the modern magistrate judge has not been squarely decided." '
Often, there is a propensity for a court to point to a distant case, label
commissioners or magistrates (the predecessors of the modern
magistrate judge) as inferior officers and then, having declared the issue
asked and answered, end the inquiry."'3 Such a static analysis assumes
that the statutory regime defining the officers' responsibilities does not
change. This assumption does not take Morrison seriously. Morrison asks
whether the balance of factors favors classification as an inferior officer
upon weighing an office's characteristics. 384 The balancing of these
considerations is not fixed when Congress subsequently amends statutes.
Reliance on an earlier period's resolution of whether magistrate judges
are inferior officers is indefensible because the office is dynamic, not
static. That the predecessor of the modern magistrate judge was deemed
an inferior officer in 1901, 1931, or even 1984, does not settle the
question whether the modern magistrate judge is an inferior officer.
Analysis by job title, without considering the evolving, underlying job
description, neglects the legal heavy lifting required by Morrison.""
The modern office of magistrate judge is a story of growth in tenure,
safeguard against removal, and enhanced jurisdiction and duties.
Consider just some of the Morrison-relevant developments in the office
since the 1931 Go-Bart decision that declared commissioners "inferior
officers., 386 In 1940, Congress authorized commissioners with additional
jurisdiction to try petty offense cases on federal enclaves upon the
parties' consent. In 1968, Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates
Act,38 thereby abolishing the office of U.S. Commissioner, and creating
380. Id. § 157(c).
381. Carlson, supra note 357, at 561 n.73.
382. For example, the leading case of Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix,
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Kennedy, J.), characterized magistrates as inferior
officers within the meaning of the Excepting Clause. No party, however, had raised an Appointments
Clause challenge, and none of the briefs, either to the three-judge panel or to the en banc court, had
addressed the issue. The lack of briefing and the doubtful necessity of the Ninth Circuit's declaration
suggest the statement is merely obiter dictum.
383. See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing the 1984 decision in
Pacemaker and claiming "it has long been settled that federal magistrates are 'inferior officers''
without considering the intervening changes to that office).
384. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988).
385. Similarly, such an analysis would not tell us, under Edmond, whether an officer today is
subordinate to a superior.
386. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 352 (93t).
387. Act of October 9, I94O, ch. 785, 54 Stat. 1058, 1058-59.
388. Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, sec. ioi, 82 Stat. i io8, iio8-14 (1968).
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the new office of U.S. Magistrate to "emphasize the judicial nature of the
position and to denote a break with the commissioner system.""" Tenure
was lengthened and secured. Whereas commissioners served part-time
only and were removable at will, magistrates were granted eight-year
terms and could be removed only for good cause."
Similarly, magistrates' jurisdiction and attendant duties enlarged.
The 1968 Act authorized magistrates to exercise all the powers that
commissioners enjoyed, and then added to them.39' Magistrates would
now aid with pretrial and discovery proceedings, review habeas corpus
petitions, and act as special masters.39 ' In addition, the Act authorized a
catchall grant of authority. District courts could grant to magistrates the
authority to perform any other duty not contrary to law or the
Constitution.93 In 1976, Congress authorized the referral of pretrial
motions, the conduct of evidentiary hearings, and the issuance of reports
and recommendations, subject to de novo review.3 94 In 1979, Congress
expanded magistrates' jurisdiction to include all federal misdemeanors
and authority to conduct jury trials in those cases.395 Most significantly,
the 1979 Act authorized magistrates, with the parties' consent, to conduct
jury trials in civil cases and enter final judgments. 6 In 199o, Congress
changed the office's title to "magistrate judge" to acknowledge the
evolution in the office.397 In 2005, Congress authorized magistrate judges
to mete out contempt sanctions without a district court's intervention?
98
Pre-Morrison, Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc. equated
being an inferior (judicial) officer with being an adjunct of a court.3"9 It
defined a judicial adjunct as "one who is dependent on the Article III
judges and does not have authority to independently exercise the judicial
power."4" It then considered "the values and purposes of Article III
judicial protections" to determine whether "the magistrates are
sufficiently dependent on Article III judges so as to be considered
'inferior officers' and thus to exercise authority within constitutional
limits.. 4 ' To determine whether an officer is adequately dependent on
the court, Geras looked to (i) the consent of parties, and (2) the
389. Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 343,348 (1979).
39
o
. Federal Magistrates Act of s968 sec. ioi, 82 Stat. 1O19-io.
391. Id. at 1113.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729.
395. Federal Magistrate Judges Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, sec. 2, 93 Stat. 643.
396. Id. sec. 2(c).
397. Judicial Improvements Act of i99o, Pub. L. No. ioI-65o. 104 Stat. 5089.
398. 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (2oo6).




independence of the judiciary. 2 The latter it operationalized as the
question of whether the district court retained supervisory authority over
the adjunct, whether the adjunct had the ability to enter a final judgment,
and whether the adjunct enjoyed a self-executing contempt power.4"
Interestingly, under the Seventh Circuit's superseded approach, neither
magistrate judges nor bankruptcy judges would constitute inferior
officers. Their appointments by the Courts of Law would be
unconstitutional under Geras. Thus, magistrate judges do not provide a
good baseline for asserting that bankruptcy judges are "inferior officers."
b. "Bankruptcy Judges Are Like Special Trial Judges of the
U.S. Tax Court"
The special trial judges of the U.S. Tax Courts may also present a
tempting analogy for the modern bankruptcy judge. Freytag v.
Commissioner concluded that they constituted inferior officers.4 4
Unfortunately, Freytag provides less guidance than one might hope. It
did not engage in any explicit analysis of what makes a special trial judge
an "inferior" rather than a "principal" officer. Thus, Freytag did not
substantially clarify the status of bankruptcy judges.
The lower courts addressed at length the status of special trial judges
as "inferior officers." In Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Commissioner, the
Second Circuit undertook a Morrison balancing analysis and concluded
the special trial judges were inferior officers.4 5 Significant to the court
was their easy removal and lack of tenure.' °6 In addition, the Chief Judge
of the Tax Court exercised "absolute control" over the extent of the
judges' duties.4 7 Special trial judges' findings for certain proceedings
could be made final only when adopted by the Tax Court.4"" The Second
Circuit did note that the special trial judges were not mere employees.
They did, after all, take testimony, conduct trials, rule on evidentiary
matters, and enforce discovery orders.4'
Bankruptcy judges resemble tax court judges more than the special
trial judges whom the tax court judges supervise. Tax court judges enjoy
lengthy fifteen-year tenures and may be removed only for cause.4"0 They
exercise nationwide jurisdiction over a specialized subject matter and
discharge the broad duties of trial judges."' Bankruptcy judges, also
402. Id. at 1040.
403. See id. at 1043-44.
404. 501 U.S. 868,892 (199i).
405. 930 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir. I991).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. In the estimation of the trial court, magistrates "had more authority and greater protection
from removal than special trial judges." First W. Gov't Sec. v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 549, 558 (199o).
409. Samuels, 930 F.3d at 986.
410. 26 U.S.C. § 7443 (f) (2oo6).
411. Id. § 7 44 2.
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appointed for lengthy tenure and removable for cause only, exercise
comparatively broader subject-matter jurisdiction than the tax court
judges, as bankruptcy judges have power to hear many civil disputes that
potentially affect the value of a debtor's estate."2 It is perhaps significant,
then, that the President appoints tax court judges with Senate advice and
consent.4"3 This fact may reflect no more than a policy judgment not to
opt these officers out of advice and consent, but it may evidence
Congress's view that tax court judges are principal officers subject to the
default appointments process.
c. "The Distinction Between Inferior and Principal Officers Is
Formalistic"
It might be argued that the judiciary ought not to police a formal
distinction between inferior and principal officers. "[W]here ... the label
that better fits an officer is fairly debatable, the fully rational
congressional determination surely merits more tolerance ... .""' After
all, the Constitution equips each department of government with the
political tools to protect its institutional interests."5 If the President were
unhappy with the proposed grant of appointment power to the judiciary,
he could veto it. Similarly, Congress could elect not to propose the
legislation, or if dissatisfied with the arrangement, repeal the
authorization. In either instance, the judiciary would defer to the choice
of the democratic branches.
There are several replies to such a line of argument. First, it might be
argued that the call for judicial deference places too much faith in
political safeguards as a means of adequately policing the separation of
powers. It may be very hard, as a practical matter, to return to the default
appointment arrangement once the power has been vested elsewhere.
Congress can repeal the vesting of the appointment power only by
statute, and a President may veto any such bill. A veto would force
Congress to secure bicameral supermajorities to override the veto. In
that context, a filibuster, perhaps by a President's Senate confederate,
could derail a proposal to divest appointment power lodged with the
executive branch. The choice to delegate proves asymmetric: power will
be easier to give than retrieve.4"7 To be sure, delegation of appointment
412. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334 (2oo6).
413. 26 U.S.C. § 7443(b), (e).
414. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nor. Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (proposing such an approach in the context of interbranch
appointments).
415. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that political
checks grant "each branch ample opportunity to defend its interests" and thereby maintain the
separation of powers).
416. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
417. Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1377-78 (1996). One reply might be that Congress
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power to the judiciary, rather than the President, presents a slightly
different concern. The judiciary itself is not in a position to block
legislatively the retrieval of appointment power, but a President or a
Senate minority pleased with the status quo of judicial appointment may
block the effort. Thus, vested appointments may not represent a present
majority's policy preferences, but the decisions of a former Congress and
President cemented by asymmetric political inertia.
Second, political checks alone fail to safeguard against what
subsequent, incremental developments may follow an initial choice to
vest appointing power. Congress's choice becomes more significant
when, as frequently happens, the appointed office gradually accumulates
power over time. There is a recurring story of offices opted out of advice
and consent that slowly grow in power. This is the case with bankruptcy
judges, judges of the criminal courts of appeals for the various armed
services, and the special trial judges of the tax court. In such instances,
the vesting of the appointments of such powerful officers outside the
usual process does not reflect a considered policy decision. Congress
backs into the choice unwittingly over the course of years. At the very
least, it is unclear that the outcome reflects a deliberate democratic
choice.
Finally, the view against judicial policing assumes that the dividing
inferior/principal line is arguable and indistinct and that the difference is
only one of degree. As the argument goes, courts ought to defer to the
still arbitrary, but at least, democratic line drawing of the political
branches. In fact, the difference is not one of degree, but one of kind.
The sine qua non of inferior officerhood is that the officer must be
subordinate to a superior officer. Whether an officer is more powerful or
less powerful in the abstract is not the inquiry. The defining distinction
between principal and inferior officers is subordination to a superior.
The distinction between principal and inferior officers implicates our
system of checks and balances. Challengers may argue that the
appointment of bankruptcy judges by other judges means the political
check of the President's nomination and the Senate's confirmation will
not apply to powerful officers. It means appointment by the circuit
courts-essentially appointment by committee-may diminish
democratic accountability for poor appointments, particularly where the
process lacks transparency. Moreover, the whole arrangement risks a
self-replicating judiciary where jurists entrench their jurisprudence by
appointing the next generation of judges.' 8 Democratic accountability
may suffer from an arrangement that excludes external political checks.
could grant appointment authority that sunsets and requires congressional reauthorization, such as
was done in the case of the independent counsel.
418. Resnik, supra note 326, at 6o7 ("[Clonstitutional judges therefore not only shape the law
[Vol. 6o:233
December 2008] BANKRUPTCY JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
d. "This Challenge Takes Morrison Too Seriously"
Does a challenge that relies on Morrison take it too seriously as a
constraint on judicial discretion? After all, if the independent counsel
could constitute an "inferior officer," then under Morrison's balancing
test, just about any officer could be labeled "inferior." It is uncertain as a
predictive matter whether the Court, presently constituted, would
conclude that bankruptcy judges are principal officers. Marathon,
however, provides a counterexample of the Court using a slippery
standard-what constitutes the "essential core" of the judicial power-to
strike down an important grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.4"9
Further, judicial opinion writing serves a public justificatory function that
aids the Court in promoting and retaining its institutional legitimacy.
Balancing tests may be elastic, but not infinitely so. At some point, the
proverbial laugh test may inspire judicial candor.
But given the inherent discretion of balancing, what would motivate
the Court to strike down section 152(a), particularly in light of the hard
landing that would result?42 One source of motivation may arise from
the different institutional interests represented within the Courts of Law.
Such interests may depend on hierarchical position. For example, the
Court has an interest in maintaining discipline over the circuit courts.
They choose the judges who serve on the bankruptcy bench and thereby
may shape that bench's jurisprudence. As a result, the bankruptcy
judges' cases may receive less intermediate appellate scrutiny than
warranted, and even less scrutiny from the Court, particularly in light of
its shrinking docket. The default appointment process might assure
greater viewpoint diversity on the bankruptcy bench and help the Court
guarantee that issues are fairly aired and scrutinized by the circuits.
Hierarchical jealousy may also animate the Court to take an
appointments challenge seriously. After all, Congress vested the power
to appoint bankruptcy courts in the circuit courts and not the Court
itself. If Congress had given to the Court the power to appoint
bankruptcy judges, a different result might obtain, but not for any good
legal reason.42'
through adjudication; they also shape the law by deciding who will serve as our statutory judges."); cf.
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045,
io67 (2ooi) (noting selection of judges as a means to cement or perpetuate a particular jurisprudential
ideology).
419. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 5o, 87 (1982).
420. The Supreme Court has declined to soften the impact of Appointments Clause challenges
through the use of the de facto officer doctrine. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 18o (1995).
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Court would invalidate the actions of unconstitutional appointees
prospectively only as it now prohibits "selective temporal barriers to the application of federal law in
noncriminal cases." Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (i993).
421. In addition, individual judges might have idiosyncratic reasons to rule against the bankruptcy
appointment regime. To the extent that appellate judges perceive appointments by their circuits to be
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e. "The Challenge Is Too Untimely to Be Meritorious"
If the challenge is meritorious, why did no one raise it earlier? First,
although litigants could point back to BAFJA's 1984 enactment without
fear of any constitutional statute of limitations, the perceived
"timeliness" of a challenge may have some persuasive value. This
concern may depend on how the litigants anchor the relevant time frame.
Luckily for the litigants, each new day is potentially a new world under
Morrison's balancing test. Whenever Congress gives a bankruptcy judge
new duties and jurisdiction, it risks altering the balance of the officer's
status. Whenever the courts interpret the bankruptcy code to authorize
new exercises of power, these cases may tip the balance. Parties could
characterize more recent changes as the tipping point at which the officer
became a principal officer, thereby placing the constitutional violation
closer in time.422 The Bowsher v. Synar challenge to the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act423 presented a similar framing issue.424 In 1985,
Congress had granted executive powers to the office of Comptroller
General-an office that had since the early 1920s been subject to
congressional removal.4"5 The Court concluded that this removal power,
when coupled with the recently added executive power, rendered the
office unconstitutional.426
Second, the delay in recognizing the Excepting Clause issue may say
less about its merits and more about the happenstance that conspired to
obscure its timely identification. The earlier In re Benny Appointments
Clause challenge, which did not address the inferior officer issue, may
have served as a proverbial "fire in the trash can" that hid the then not-
yet-ripe issue from future litigants.427 In addition, it has only been since
Morrison in 1988 that a precedent cast doubt on the status of bankruptcy
judges as inferior officers. Further, bankruptcy judges may have been
able to dodge the issue by ordering withdrawal of the reference.25 Lastly,
bankruptcy counsel might understandably be reluctant to challenge the
validity of their local bankruptcy judge's appointment. They are repeat
players who will litigate again before their judge. Nonbankruptcy
"political," "partisan" or "ideological," they might vote to strike down the existing appointment
arrangement, even if only in noisy dissent. Similarly, certain district judges might be willing to strike
down bankruptcy appointments based on the extra-legal, historical antipathy between certain district
judges and the bankruptcy bench. See Mund, Part Two, supra note 64, at 184.
422. For example, Congress granted the courts authority to entertain claims against state
governmental departments in 1994. I IU.S.C. § lo6(a)(1) (994).
423. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038.
424. 478 U.S. 714, 743 (1986).
425. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(I)(B) (2oo6).
426. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732, 736.
427. See supra notes 103-o6 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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attorneys or pro se litigants might be those most willing to rock the
proverbial boat. The issue, however, may be comparatively invisible for
these nonspecialists.
C. THE CHALLENGE UNDER EDMOND-COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS
Beyond interpreting "inferior" as subordinate, Edmond also offered
a construction of what it means to be subordinate: to have your
"work ... directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate." '429 If originalist interpretation is ascertaining the public meaning
of words within context, then construction is the necessary judicial
lawmaking required to implement an interpretation.430
i. Directed and Supervised at Some Level
Although Edmond says that to be an inferior officer is to be a
subordinate to a superior officer, the Appointments Clause does not
itself provide guidance on what makes one subordinate. Scalia supplied
his construction of the vague subordinate interpretation as a rule of
decision: an inferior officer is one "whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate. ' 43 ' Applying this
construction, Scalia permitted supervision of an inferior officer to be split
between different hierarchical superiors432 and suggested that control
need not be complete.433 He further noted the power of a superior officer
in Edmond to remove "without cause" the inferior officers,434 and noted
that the inferior executive officers' actions required a superior's approval
before they became finalized.42 5 It is unclear whether these last two
considerations were necessary to Scalia's conclusion or sufficient to
establish it.
Under a strong reading of Edmond, supervision by way of appellate
review of work product and by promulgation of rules governing inferiors
would suffice to constitute subordination. A "weak" reading might
require that a superior have a plenary removal power, together with
429. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
430. Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Cm. L. REV. IOI, io8-
09 (2oo0).
431. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663. Scalia's formulation is too specific to the appointment at issue in
Edmond. The President may appoint inferior officers if so vested, but of course the President is not
appointed by advice and consent. U.S. CONST. art. II, § i. The revised construction would provide that
to be subordinate means to be supervised and directed at some level by the appointing authority.
432. Id. at 664.
433. Id. at 665.
434. Id. at 664. In Morrison v. Olson, Justice Scalia suggested that removal at will would constitute
per se subordination. 487 U.S. 654, 716 (3988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
435. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665.
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appellate review and rule promulgation, in order to effect sufficient
control to make an officer inferior.
Depending on one's reading of Edmond, Scalia's construction might
allow bankruptcy judges to be characterized as inferior officers. For non-
core proceedings, bankruptcy judges are supervised closely. They
prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which they
submit to district judges (who are appointed by advice and consent).
436
They, in turn, may enter a final order or judgment after reviewing de
novo any objection to the proposed findings.437
Core proceedings, where bankruptcy judges may enter final orders
and judgments, present a closer question, but neither do they present any
problem for Scalia's construction. Although district courts do not
approve these orders before they become effective, the bankruptcy
judges' work product remains subject to appellate review, first by the
district courts and then by the courts of ap eals (and perhaps
intermediately by a bankruptcy appellate panel).43 The district courts
and courts of appeals-both appointed by advice and consent-supervise
bankruptcy judges "at some level" by appellate review as of right, even if
that review may be deferential as to certain matters.439 It is of no moment
that this supervision may be layered and not immediate. Scalia's
construction allows discretionary space for inferior officer autonomy."
The bankruptcy judges ultimately "have no power to render a final
decision... unless permitted to do so" by superior judicial officers, even
if that "permission" results from a party's failure to take an appeal as of
right to supervisory judicial officers." In addition to this supervision of
work product, bankruptcy judges are supervised administratively. The
Supreme Court promulgates the rules of procedure and evidence that
regulate proceedings before bankruptcy judges,"2 and the courts of
appeals retain a (qualified) power to remove them for enumerated
grounds for cause."3
436. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2006).
437. Id. § 157(c).
438. Id. § 158(a).
439. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int'l Fibercom, Inc. (In re Int'l Fibercom, Inc.), 503 F.3 d 933,
946 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a bankruptcy court's factual determination under the clearly erroneous
standard).
440. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
441. Id. at 665.
442. 28 U.S.C. § 2075.
443. Id. § 152(e). Edmond might be read to require an unqualified power to remove an inferior
officer. If that is the case, the circuit courts do not sufficiently supervise the bankruptcy judges.
Alternatively, Edmond might suggest that a plenary power to remove suffices to establish supervision
but was not necessary in light of the other mechanisms of control that established a supervisory
relationship.
(Vol. 60:233
December 2008] BANKRUPTCY JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
2. Sufficient Control- the Marathon Adjunct Test
The Marathon plurality developed a concept in the Article III
context closely analogous to "subordinate" that could be employed in the
Article II context. Whether bankruptcy judges could be characterized as
true adjuncts to a court depended on whether they "were subject to
sufficient control by an [Article] III district court."'" This concept of
"sufficient control" as the sine qua non of "adjunctness" is nearly
synonymous with the "supervision and direction" construction of
subordinate. Both concepts serve the separation of powers in their
respective contexts by preserving ultimate decision-making authority
with hierarchically superior judicial officers." 5
That "supervision and direction" overlaps with "sufficient control"
implies that challenges asserted under Article II and Article III may rise
and fall together. If bankruptcy judges present an Appointments Clause
problem because they are inadequately supervised as inferior officers, it
suggests an Article III problem because of insufficient control.
Conversely, if there is an Article III problem (i.e., the bankruptcy judge
is not an adjunct), there may also be an Article II Appointments Clause
problem because the officer is not subordinate to a superior. This
parallelism also suggests that, rather than adopt approaches to
supervision/control that differ depending on context, the Court would be
better off developing a construction of "subordinate" that answers both
the demands of Articles II and III.
The Marathon plurality provided some guidance on what constituted
"sufficient control."" 6 It cited magistrates as true adjuncts: they
considered motions only upon the district court's reference, their
proposed findings of fact and recommendation were subject to de novo
review, and they were appointed and subject to removal by the district
court (upon good cause)."7 In contrast, the plurality rejected the notion
that the 1978 bankruptcy judges were under "sufficient control" of the
district courts: they could issue final judgments that were binding and
enforceable" 8 and their judgments were subject to review only under a
deferential standard."9 Marathon rejected the notion that "some degree
of appellate review" amounted to "sufficient control" to qualify
bankruptcy courts as Article III adjuncts. °
Applying Marathon's standard in the Article II context, today's
bankruptcy judges do not constitute inferior officers under a "sufficient
444. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (1982).
445. Id. at 83.
446. Id. at 79.
447. Id. (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1980)).
448. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 85-86.
449. Id. at 85.
450. Id. at 86 n.39.
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control" construction of supervision. Appellate review over core
proceedings will not prove "sufficient control." Moreover, bankruptcy
judges' orders in core proceedings are self-executing. There is no need
for approval from a superior judicial officer before the order or judgment
may take effect.
3. Personal Supervision
The final construction of "subordinate" might require even closer
supervision. In In re Sealed Case (Morrison v. Olson), D.C. Circuit Judge
Lawrence Silberman offered his construction that to be subordinate is to
be "subject to personal supervision.""' He opined in dicta that Article III
judges would not constitute inferior officers because they are "not
subject to personal supervision." '452 He thought that appellate review of
judicial opinions rather than supervision of the judges themselves did not
suffice.453 For the same reason, he would not allow that rules of evidence
and procedure constitute the supervision of judges.454
The Silberman construction would not support the conclusion that
bankruptcy judges are inferior officers. Although the courts of appeals
review the decisions of the bankruptcy judges and promulgate their
procedural rules, the rules do not extend to the persons of bankruptcy
judges, only to their work product. To be sure, the courts of appeals may
remove bankruptcy judges for good cause.455 Silberman's construction,
however, would not allow that such a qualification of removal power
could still amount to supervision in the case of the independent counsel.
After all, the Attorney General could remove the independent counsel
upon a showing of good cause, but Silberman deemed that insufficient to
render that officer subordinate.
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Although this Article has questioned the method of appointing
bankruptcy judges, it has not suggested that bankruptcy judges are
undesirable. Bankruptcy judges are useful judicial specialists who handle
a substantial caseload for the federal courts. Were there a challenge, it
would jeopardize these officers' appointments, and cause tremendous
disruption to their work. Part V proposes a means of saving these officers
from challenge, and further suggests a possible policy innovation that
could obtain under one scenario of an unsuccessful appointments
challenge.
451. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476,483 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 483 n.14.
455. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2oo6).
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A. SAVING BANKRUPTCY JUDGES FROM AN ARTICLE II CHALLENGE
Congress could proactively adopt several strategies to save these
appointments from a successful challenge. The most direct, anticipatory
solution would be to amend section 152(a) to provide for presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation. Those judges serving presently
would need to be nominated, confirmed, and appointed en masse. Such
an approach would inoculate officers against an Appointments Clause
challenge prospectively.
Two other anticipatory responses are possible, depending on the
type of challenge feared. First, Congress could cut back on the office of
bankruptcy judge in anticipation of a Morrison-type challenge. It could
abbreviate the length of tenure and make removal at will, or it could
grant the office less jurisdiction and remove important duties, such as the
ability to conduct jury trials. Second, if Congress anticipated an Edmond-
type challenge, it could ease the restrictions on removal of bankruptcy
judges by giving the courts of appeals the ability to remove them at will.
Such power would reinforce the hierarchical superior-inferior
relationship. 6' These solutions make bankruptcy judges either less useful,
or less independent, but they help diminish the possibility of successful
challenge.
B. RETAINING APPOINTMENT BY THE COURTS OF LAW WHILE GRANTING
ARTICLE III TENURE TO BANKRUPTCY JUDGES
If inferior officerhood turns on a "strong" reading of Edmond-such
that a challenge to the appointments were to fail, an interesting
implication is that a bankruptcy judge's tenure is irrelevant to the
question of whether they are inferior officers. Bankruptcy judges could
be clothed with Article III tenure, and yet remain inferior officers
appointable by the courts.457 Such a judge may still be "directed and
supervised at some level"-i.e., supervised by a superior-in the absence
of at-will tenure."' To be sure, easy removeability does establish an
inferior's "here-and-now subservience" to an authority wielding a
removal power.459 Under a strong reading of Edmond, however, a
superior officer could still direct and control an inferior by other means
short of removal, including ordinary appellate review, and the ability to
456. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 716 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
457. For the debate over whether bankruptcy judges should be granted Article III tenure, compare
Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 529
(i998), with Plank, supra note 373. See also NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS 34-35 (1997) (recommending procedural and jurisdictional simplification by granting
the bankruptcy judges Article III status).
458. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 65i, 663 (997).
459. Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986) (characterizing comptroller general as
subservient to Congress because it could remove him from office).
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promulgate procedural rules for inferiors.46' Thus, Article III tenure for
bankruptcy judges, and appointment by the Courts of Law, do not
necessarily present mutually exclusive choices.,6' This result should be
welcome news for scholars concerned that the necessity of bankruptcy
judge reappointment may result in judges attempting to curry favor with
the local bar. 6 ' Article III bankruptcy judges would not be subject to the
same post-appointment external threats to judicial independence.
On the other hand, if Morrison controls, granting bankruptcy judges
Article III tenure would neither avoid nor ameliorate the potential
Appointments Clause difficulty elaborated in this Article. In fact, such an
approach could possibly aggravate the appointments problem. Per
Morrison, officers' tenure and removeability must be weighed in
determining whether they are inferior or principal officers. Were
bankruptcy judges to possess Article III tenure during good behavior,
these Morrison factors would weigh against the conclusion that they are
inferior officers and toward the conclusion that they are principal
officers. That conclusion would undermine the permissibility of
appointment by the courts.
C. APPOINTING ARTICLE III JUDGES BY THE COURTS OF LAW
If Edmond governs the definition of "inferior officer," and
depending on the construction of subordination adopted, Congress could
authorize hierarchically superior federal courts to appoint inferior court
judges. This outcome would be permitted because the judges of the
inferior courts-the court of appeals and district courts-constitute
"inferior Officers" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. The
Clause enumerates only "Judges of the supreme Court" as principal
officers subject to the default appointment rule. 6 ' It does not mention
expressly the judges of the inferior courts. Article III, by comparison,
uses "Judges ... of the supreme.. . Court[]" in contradistinction to
"Judges... of the... inferior Courts." 6' The Clause's sole enumeration
of "Judges of the supreme Court" does not encompass "Judges of the
inferior Courts."
460. Cf Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664. In addition to being subject to a superior's procedural rules and
appellate review, the Court of Criminal Appeals judges were also subject to removal by their
superiors. Id.
461. But see Plank, supra note 373, at 628 (asserting that the present method of judicial selection
would not permit bankruptcy judges to be vested with Article III tenure).
462. LoPucKi, supra note 135, at 20-21. Such a change might not solve the problem of competition
for big cases, but it would avoid the necessity of reappointment and the attendant incentive to curry
favor with the local bankruptcy bar.
463. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
464. U.S. CONST. art. III, § i; cf United States v. Eaton, i69 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (enumeration of
"consul" in Appointments Clause "does not embrace a subordinate and temporary officer like that of
vice consul").
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Instead, inferior court judges fall within the catchall category of the
Appointments Clause: "all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law.' '461 Congress establishes the inferior courts and the
accompanying offices by law. Article III judges are "officers of the
United States" because they exercise "significant authority" of the
United States. 66 The Court, however, has never held these judges to be
principal, rather than inferior, officers.i67 Inferior court judges may
constitute "inferior officers" provided that they are "directed and
supervised at some level" by superior officers."6
Although several commentators have questioned whether the judges
of the inferior Article III courts are "inferior officers,"' 69 their arguments
do not foreclose that possibility. First, Professor David Stras and Ryan
Scott argue that although the Appointments Clause enumerates "Judges
of the supreme Court" as subject to presidential appointment with
Senate advice and consent, the omission of the "Judges of the inferior
Court" is less revelatory than the language would suggest.47 ° After the
Philadelphia Convention, it was uncertain there would be any inferior
courts to staff, as the Madisonian Compromise on lower courts granted
Congress only the discretionary power to create lower courts.47' It did not
guarantee their creation. Thus, the contingency of the inferior courts
(and their officers) suggests an alternative reason for the absence of
parallel language covering inferior court judges: the Excepting Clause
neglected to provide for the contingent existence of these officers, and/or
captured them in the Appointments Clause catchall of "all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law. '47" The Clause does
not relegate inferior judges to inferior officer status by its silence.
Reading the Constitution intratextually, however, suggests that this
silence was not an oversight. For example, Article III, section I does
anticipate that Congress might choose to create and staff inferior courts,
465. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
466. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
467. Individual Justices and judges have expressed their views. Compare Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651, 667 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (doubting inferior court judges are "inferior
officers"), with Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1053 (7 th Cir. 1984) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (presuming "inferior Officers" would encompass judges of the inferior courts).
468. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
469. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris
Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 275 n.103 (1992); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453, 50 n.327 (2oo7).
470. E-mail from Ryan W. Scott, Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Justice, and David R. Stras, Assoc.
Professor of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law School, to Author (June 6, 2007, o8:37 CST) [hereinafter Scott
E-mail] (on file with author).
471. U.S. CONST. art. III, § i.
472. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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and provided contingently for the conditions of their office. The section
provides that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and the inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." '473 This anticipation of
"the inferior Courts" illustrates that the Constitution contemplated the
possibility-even the probability-of such inferior court judges. In light
of this, the neglect hypothesis seems less probable. Of course, it remains
that inferior court judges might be captured by the catchall ("all other
Officers of the United States"), as nonenumerated principal officers
nonetheless subject to the Appointments Clause. But the Clause does
not foreclose textually the possibility that inferior court judges may be
inferior officers.
Second, Stras and Scott suggest that permitting the President alone
to appoint inferior court judges would undo the plan of the
Convention.474 The Philadelphia Convention had considered and rejected
appointments of principal officers (judicial or otherwise) by the
President alone.47  The Framers reached a carefully negotiated
compromise in which the President would nominate and, upon Senate
advice and consent, appoint officers of the United States.47 Thus, the
argument goes, it would be strange if the Appointments Clause were
interpreted in such a way that Congress could vest the President with the
sole power to appoint inferior judges.477 If Morrison were the law of the
land, and interbranch vested appointments were permitted, this critique
would have some force. Under Edmond, inferior court judges would not
be subordinate to the President. Congress could not vest "the President
alone" with the power to appoint them. Opting judicial officers out of
advice and consent would not unravel the Convention's appointments
plan as the President would never have the sole power to appoint judges.
Third, Stras and Scott claim a settled historical practice that Article
III judges are principal officers of the United States subject to
presidential nomination and Senate advice and consent.4"8 They note
Joseph Story's famous dictum that Congress had never opted Article III
judges out of the default appointments process.479 Story, however,
acknowledged that "[w]hether the Judges of the inferior courts of the
United States are such inferior officers... is a point, upon which no
solemn judgment has ever been had." '  He noted that among the
473. Id. art. III, § I (emphasis added).





479. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrminoN OF THE UNITED STATES § 1593, at 456 n.I
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
48o. Id.
[Vol. 60:233
December 2008] BANKRUPTCY JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
political branches of government "there does not seem to have been any
exact line drawn, who are, and who are not, to be deemed inferior
officers in the sense of the constitution, whose appointment does not
necessarily require the concurrence of the senate. ''4 ' That Congress has
not vested the appointment of Article III judges in the Courts of Law
reflects a policy choice on the part of Congress. The long track record of
not opting out is evidence only that Congress will not take the option
often.iz It, however, remains an option to take. It may eventually
exercise the option with respect to Article III judges.
Finally, Lee Liberman Otis has argued that the permissible vesting
of the appointments power in the Courts of Law (including the inferior
courts), the Heads of Departments, and the President alone "strongly
suggests that all members of the 'Courts of Law' are principal officers
who must receive Senate confirmation., 4" It is unclear why it should be
assumed that officers who are permissible appointers must necessarily be
subject to confirmation. After all, Congress may vest the "President
alone" with the appointment power, but he does not receive his office by
confirmation. If the argument is that only officers who are the heads of
branches may be given appointment power, it is unclear why the Heads
of Departments-hierarchically inferior to the President-would be
eligible to receive the appointment power. If the argument is that district
and circuit judges must receive confirmation because they are powerful,
it is a resort to the discredited Morrison approach of distinguishing
inferior from principal officers: an officer is inferior not because
supervised but because the officer is "lesser" -with respect to duties, etc.
Lastly, Edmond may have foreclosed this argument by decoupling an
officer's principal/inferior status from the question of who may appoint.44
CONCLUSION
Whether "bankruptcy judges are unconstitutional" may depend on
the question asked: the normative one ("ought they be unconstitutional
under existing law?") or the predictive one ("would the courts actually
hold the bankruptcy courts unconstitutional?"). The answer to the first
question depends on whether Morrison survives Edmond. Bankruptcy
judges, who are powerful officers, probably tip Morrison's balancing test
toward principal officers. But, under Edmond, the power of the office is
481. Id. § 1530, at 386 (emphasis omitted).
482. Samahon, supra note 236, at 833.
483. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 469, at 275 n.103 (emphasis added).
484. In Weiss v. United States, Justice Souter had characterized the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax
Court at issue in Freytag as a principal officer. 51o U.S. 163, 191-92 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). He
reasoned that must be the case because Congress had entrusted him with the power to appoint special
trial judges. Id. In Edmond, the majority rejected that position and explained that Freytag decided
only whether the special trial judge was an inferior officer. 520 U.S. 65I, 663 (1997). This clarification
suggests that wielding appointment authority does not necessarily imply principal officer status.
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irrelevant to the definition of inferior officer. Inferior officers can be
powerful officers. Although an inferior's removability by a superior
remains a mark of supervision and control, the Excepting Clause's
bottom line requires that the officer be subordinate, which in turn may
depend on particular judicial constructions of what it means to be a
subordinate officer. Thus, the present method of appointing bankruptcy
judges is probably permissible under the subordinate interpretation, but
not under Morrison.
If Edmond controls, the answer to the predictive question is likely
"no." In such a case, the Court need not be particularly stouthearted, just
candid. It could (and should) recognize forthrightly that Edmond
overruled Morrison sub silentio. Such an act might require a stiff spine,
but not as much as the alternative of invalidating the appointments of
hundreds of bankruptcy judges. Moreover, there is a reward for the
candor. For the lower courts and commentators, it would clear up the
Court's intentions with respect to Morrison. Until Morrison is red
flagged with the words "no longer good for at least one point of law," its
unpredictability menaces the appointments of powerful officers, who
have been opted out of confirmation generally, and the validity of
bankruptcy appointments specifically.
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